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ABSTRACT 
The Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) has responded to the 
consequences of terrorist incidents for decades, but global trends in active-shooter 
terrorism may force firefighters to operate in an active, hostile environment, and not just 
in the aftermath of attacks.  In assault-style terrorism, a swift-moving, networked enemy 
combines small-arms with explosives or accelerants, causing extensive fires and smoke 
conditions, further endangering victims or hostages.  To continue its position as a lead 
innovator in the national fire service, the FDNY must create new strategies and 
collaborations to frame its participation in swarm-like terrorist attacks, requiring a 
plurality of expertise from the across the emergency-responder spectrum.  In light of this 
emerging threat, the all-hazards approach is no longer adequate.  The answer to Mumbai-
style attacks may require combined fire/police units.  The units can only succeed with an 
understanding of group bias, which must be attenuated or managed for the integrated unit 
to function effectively. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) has responded to the 
consequences of terrorist incidents for decades, but global trends in active-shooter 
terrorism may force firefighters to operate in an active, hostile environment, and not just 
in the aftermath of attacks.  In assault-style terrorism, a swift-moving, networked enemy 
combines small-arms with explosives or accelerants, causing extensive fires and smoke 
conditions, further endangering victims or hostages.  To continue its position as a lead 
innovator in the national fire service, the FDNY must create new strategies and 
collaborations to frame its participation in swarm-like terrorist attacks, requiring a 
plurality of expertise from across the emergency-responder spectrum.  In light of this 
emerging threat, the all-hazards approach is no longer adequate.  The answer to Mumbai-
style attacks may require combined fire/police units.  The units can only succeed with an 
understanding of group bias, which must be attenuated or managed for the integrated unit 
to function effectively.      
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Problem Statement 
With active-shooter or paramilitary-style terrorist strikes, increasingly called 
“Mumbai-style” attacks, the consequences of terrorism can no longer be neatly classified 
into traditional hazardous materials’ categories that include chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE).  This new form of terrorism is a direct 
challenge to all-hazards emergency response doctrine and single-agency mitigation 
strategies.  Currently, compartmented standard operating procedures for first responders 
do not adequately address active-shooter terrorist attacks when fire and explosives are 
combined with conventional firearms.  To face this new threat, police and fire 
departments need more than coordination, but better integration.  A proposed solution to 
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the challenges related to active-shooter terror may be a joint fire/police response unit of 
“pre-first responders” who can enter a hostile environment ahead of traditional first 
responders.  This vanguard unit could simultaneously engage, or at least delay, armed 
terrorists in a fire or smoke environment to extract civilians or hostages who are 
threatened by any combination of firearms, fire, heat, smoke, explosives, or collapse.  For 
the proposed vanguard unit, which will be made up of traditional rivals, to succeed, an 
examination of identity and group bias is necessary.  
2. Research Question 
1. As terrorists shift to quick, coordinated strikes from network-based units, 
would fire and police departments best meet this threat with a dual-agency 
network of well-organized, agile response units of their own? 
2. How can an inquiry into military swarming strategies better prepare 
emergency responders for paramilitary terrorism?  
3. Is the all-hazards approach as a terrorism mitigation strategy still valid for 
first responders during complex, active-shooter attacks?  
4. How can the latest psychological theories in group and organizational bias 
be used in the creation of joint fire/police units? 
3. Significance of Research  
Active-shooter terrorist attacks are not random.  When several attacks are studied 
operationally, patterns emerge that can be useful to fire service preparations for such 
attacks. Another pattern, though disturbing, suggests that these incidents should be 
concluded as quickly as possible because negotiations are not the primary aim of the 
attackers.  The terrorists are less concerned with their demands, if any, being met than 
with maximizing casualty counts and media exposure.     
If successful, joint fire-police units created specifically for complex, active-
shooter terrorist attacks would serve as a catalyst for better agency collaboration.  Joint 
fire-police units will not only thrive operationally, as historical group biases dissolve, but 
possibly be a tipping point, fostering a new era of broad interagency cooperation.  Studies 
of identity and group bias would help leaders anticipate problems and correct behavioral 
and cultural problems before they occur.  “Our distrust is very expensive,” Ralph Waldo 
Emerson once said (Emerson Central, 2010).  The paper is not suggesting a department-
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wide merger but tests the idea of small, elite inter-agency units to maximize first 
responder effectiveness in one specific type of incident.   
For emergency responders, theories based on real-world observations are a good 
complement to theories postulated from controlled studies.  The response issues related to 
complex, swarm-like terrorist attacks will require a level of collaboration and trust yet 
unseen in the New York City emergency response community.  Despite the complexity 
that surrounds these attacks, the FDNY must develop an interagency framework before 
an attack occurs; this ultimately will mean the difference between life and death for 
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II. METHODOLOGY AND INTERVIEWS  
A. METHODS TRIANGULATION 
Data for this thesis was collected from a variety of source types and methods: 
primarily a literature review, case studies and the phenomenological research method for 
interviews, in an approach called methods triangulation (Johnson, Burke & Christensen, 
1997). The intent of this research is to present a problem that emergency responders face 
(paramilitary terrorism), provide an acceptable “intervention” (Hocevar & Wollman, 
2008), such as integrated response units, and forecast one debilitating impediment to the 
solution, namely group bias, before a tragedy occurs—at least for New York City 
emergency responders.   
The historical examples on complex active-shooter incidents, whether motivated 
by crime or terrorism (Mumbai, Beslan, Columbine, and Freddy’s Fashion Mart), will be 
presented through a specific type of case study called structured-focus comparison in 
which the researcher looks for parallels or commonalties in the cases.  It is important that 
the examples are similar but not indistinguishable, as it is the slight variances in the 
incidents that are most revealing.  Data was collected from academic literature (mostly 
abstracts) or media sources.  The brief snapshot on biological and military examples of 
swarming were compiled from books and articles.  The examination of group bias as it 
relates to a proposed integrated unit, the crux of this paper, was based mostly on articles 
in psychology journals, and augmented with input from interviewees, who are not experts 
in cognitive psychology, but who still provided relevant insights. 
B. PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH STUDY  
Research, as it relates to the viability a joint fire/police unit, was made through 
qualitative research design, specifically, through the phenomenological research method 




particular situation” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 139).  In this inquiry, the “situation” is 
the idea of a joint unit to address a very specific threat, namely a Mumbai-type or siege-
style terror attack.   
Phenomenology, whose origins can be traced back to the philosophical and 
epistemological works of Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, was put 
forth by German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), who named his method 
phenomenology, or the science of “pure phenomena.”  Husserl believed, “to arrive at 
certainty, anything outside immediate experience must be ignored, and in this way the 
external world is reduced to the contents of personal consciousness,” according to an 
article in the International Journal of Qualitative Methods (Groenewald, 2004, p. 4).  The 
article further explained: “A researcher applying phenomenology is concerned with the 
lived experiences of the people” (p. 5).  For Husserl, it came down to the experience, 
which is a fitting avenue of inquiry for a topic that can only be understood from the 
viewpoint of experts in the field on emergency response.         
Phenomenological research is largely based on open and “unstructured” dialogue 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 139), which closely resembles an informal conversation. 
Strong emphasis is placed on the subjects’ personal perspectives and interpretations 
(Lester, n.d.).  The method is meant to promote practical theory, supporting or 
challenging policy and action (Lester, n.d.); in this case, the inquiry assessed a policy 
vacuum as no joint fire-police unit exists in this specific context of terrorism 
preparedness. 
C. THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
The fluidity of the conversations encouraged both interviewer and interviewees to 
explore issues in either a wide breadth or in a highly-focused manner, when appropriate, 
but the main purpose of the interviews was to achieve “minimum structure and maximum 
depth” (Lester, n.d.).  Interviewees were asked a list of prepared questions, but the 
organic nature of the conversations, where the interviewer freely offered his own opinion 
and insights at certain points to gently steer the dialogue, usually brought more 
revelations than the literal answers to the questions. This is consistent with the 
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phenomenological view that researchers cannot fully divorce themselves from their own 
preconceptions or assumptions, nor should they “pretend otherwise” (Groenewald, 2004, 
p. 7).  Open-ended questions, along with interviewer’s ability to adjust the direction of 
the conversation based on the answers given, allowed for far greater creative and original 
responses than would have been achieved in a multiple-choice survey or more confined 
closed-question inquiry.   
D. CODING 
Interview analysis is expected to be “messy” (Lester, n.d.), as input may not 
always fit into neat categories, but the researcher must still strive to make sense of the 
data. After breaking down the transcripts into small segments and identifying common 
themes, information gained from the interviews was pooled and categorized, a 
quantitative research technique called coding.  Codes were not predetermined prior to 
interviews but were assigned as themes emerged, which is consistent with “inductive” 
coding, defined as categorization after the data is examined (Hocevar & Wollman, 2008). 
The idea of joint fire-police counter-terror units in the face of active-shooter 
assaults is original, making research problematic.  With so little academic literature 
devoted to this topic, interviews of subject matter experts (SMEs) in emergency response 
seemed the most appropriate information source to interpret this emerging mode of 
terrorism.  The four interviewees (three fire chiefs and one counterterrorism expert from a 
municipal police department) brought unique perspectives from their sub-specialties to 
the study.   
Data analysis from interview transcripts followed four steps (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2005, p. 140): 
1. Identify statements that relate to the topic. 
2. Group statements in “meaning units” (coding).   
3. Seek divergent perspectives.  
4. Construct a composite. 
Three of the four interview transcripts were coded into three cascading categories 
(note: the fourth interview was not recorded nor coded as the dialogue only pertained to 
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the Freddy’s Fashion Mart incident).  First, remarks where categorized into four 
emergency preparedness categories (prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery).  
Due to the nature of the fire service’s mission and the dual-unit proposal, over 90 percent 
of comments fell into either response or preparedness.  Then, remarks were coded into 
about 30 categories (e.g., training/education, Mumbai threat, preplanning, etc.), and then 
the data was sub-coded into slightly more specific parts (e.g., breaking point, general 
training, joint training, time, etc.), which totaled over 50 unique categories.  Not every 
interviewee touched on every code or sub-code.  Sub-codes provided more detailed 
descriptions of interviewees’ statements, and the most applicable ones are inserted as 
quotes or paraphrases throughout the paper.   
The graph of total codes from all three interviewees, presented as an appendix at 
the end of the paper, totals 262 comments, but not all codes are unique.  Some entries 
were listed more than once, depending on whether the remark overlapped with two or 
more codes (e.g., active-shooter with fire or enemy adaptability) or sub-codes (e.g., 
response or preparedness).  In all, 129 unique comments were coded.  
E. THE INTERVIEWEES  
The four interviewees were selected based on their expertise in a narrow subset of 
firefighting or law enforcement related to terrorism or disaster preparedness.  The 
interviews, which were conducted in person, took between 30 and 75 minutes.  
Interviews were recorded with the voice memo application on an iPhone, transferred to a 
laptop, and transcribed from iTunes to a Microsoft Word document, and eventually 
collated on an Excel spreadsheet.    
 
The following is a list of sample questions: 
 As terrorists shift to quick, coordinated strikes from network-based units, 
would the FDNY and the NYPD best meet this threat with a dual-agency 
network of well-organized, agile response units of their own? 
 How does the department need to prepare for active-shooter terrorist 
attacks?  What are we doing well?  Not doing well? 
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 If more than one attack occurs simultaneously, is the borough command 
system adequate? 
 Do you think it is possible to simultaneously fight fires and engage 
terrorists to free hostages or other threatened civilians?  Would we have to 
go beyond the idea of tactical paramedics to firefighters as full members 
of an assault force? 
 Can we ignore people trapped by fire and smoke because it is too 
dangerous for firefighters? What are our operational limits at Mumbai-
style attacks? 
 How do you feel about a joint FD/PD unit?  What are some interagency 
alternatives?  
The subject matter experts (SME) interviewed include: Assistant Chief Joseph W. 
Pfeifer (FDNY); Battalion Chief Joseph R. Downey (FDNY); an anonymous 
counterterrorism expert from a municipal police department; and Deputy Chief Michael 
E. McPartland (FDNY), who was not coded.   
The following is a more detailed look at the subjects and their interviews: 
1. FDNY Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer 
Joseph Pfeifer, an expert in fire service counterterrorism preparedness, has 
commanded the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster and Preparedness (CTDP) for 
the past seven years.  Pfeifer, best known as the first-to-arrive FDNY chief at the World 
Trade Center on 9/11, combines his almost 30-year career in the fire service with an 
extensive graduate-level education, which includes degrees from the Harvard Kennedy 




Figure 1.   Coding of Joe Pfeifer’s Comments 
The coding reveals that Joe Pfeifer spoke mainly on training and education, 
interdependencies, and, most frequently, fire as a weapon.  Chief Pfeifer sets the tone of 
all three coded interviews with an emphasis on training and education.  Unique to his 
interview, Pfeifer’s comments on networks, novelty and adaptability were not prolific, 
but had a disproportional impact on topic examinations later in the paper.    
2. FDNY Battalion Chief Joseph R. Downey 
Joseph Downey, who currently works in the Rescue Battalion, has served in the 
FDNY for 26 years.  Besides his regular duties in FDNY Special Operations Command 
(SOC), Downey heads the FDNY component of New York Task Force 1 (NY-TF1), 
NYC’s Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) unit, a disaster emergency response unit 
consisting of FDNY firefighters and NYPD personnel.  NY-TF1 is run through the New 
York City Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), and the taskforce program 
is coordinated nationwide by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  
NY-TF1 has deployed to natural disasters and other emergencies about 10 times in 20 
years, most notably to New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and to Haiti in the 
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aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. Joe Downey, who alternates command of NY-TF1 
with a police counterpart, is uniquely qualified to comment on integrated fire-police units 
as the taskforce is only example of joint FDNY/NYPD group.    
 
 
Figure 2.   Coding of Joe Downey’s Comments 
A sample of the most common 17 codes present in the interview show that Joe 
Downey’s responses focused mainly on NY-TF1 (as “other models”) and the idea of a 
joint unit, consistent with his expertise.  Based on the frequency of comments, the 
histogram shows that Joe Downey believes in the importance of training and education.  
With his experience with an interagency unit, the number on comments on group bias and 
equality show how well matched his experiences fit with the concept of a joint fire/police 
assault unit.  What the histogram does not reflect is how relevant Downey’s remarks were 
to the inquiry on group bias in Chapter V.    
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3. Anonymous Law-Enforcement Source 
The counterterrorism expert for a municipal police department agreed to offer his 
insights on condition of anonymity.   
 
Figure 3.   Coding of Comments (Anonymous Police Source) 
The anonymous source has served almost 20 years in a major urban police 
department.  The source has extensive counterterrorism training and experience.  His 
willingness to be interviewed provided an essential component to this research.  This 
paper would not be complete without the input from a veteran law enforcement official.   
Similar to the fire chiefs’ interviews, the anonymous police interviewee focused 
predominately on training/education.  As a member of law enforcement, his comments 
gravitated towards the Mumbai threat.  The spike in joint-unit entries is attributable to the 
interviewer’s line of questioning.  Similar to Joe Pfeifer, the source stressed an honest 
assessment of delivery of agency assets, or time considerations, which is listed as a 
middle entry for both interviewees.     
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4. FDNY Deputy Chief Michael E. McPartland 
Mike McPartland is a 31-year veteran of the FDNY, who currently works in 
Division 1 in lower Manhattan and has worked most of his career in Harlem and the 
Bronx.  Though Mike McPartland’s experience and expertise is evident, he was asked to 
speak on the narrow subject of his experiences as the first-to-arrive fire officer at the 
Freddy’s Fashion Mart massacre in December 1995. This massacre was a lesser-known 
incident where NYC emergency personnel faced an armed gunman, hostages, fire, and 
smoke after a racially-charged protest turned violent.  Chief McPartland’s interview was 
not recorded, nor was the transcript coded, due to logistical issues and the fact that the 
interview subject was confined to the Freddy’s incident.  
F. GENERAL FINDINGS FROM THE THREE CODED INTERVIEWS 
Interviewees were unanimous in their belief that the concept of joint fire/police 
units is viable in combating paramilitary-style terrorism involving fire as a weapon.  All 
respondents gave serious thought to organizational limits, including capacity, capability, 
and delivery (time).  An expeditious response, more than capability/capacity, was more 
of a concern for emergency responders, especially if multiple attacks occur 
simultaneously.  The need to train all firefighters and police officers (from command 
level to operating units), to at least the awareness level regarding the Mumbai-style 
threat, was a surprise finding but a very powerful concept.   
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Figure 4.   Coding of Comments From Three Primary Interviewees 
When all 262 multiple entries are listed in a common graph (see Appendix A) for 
the three primary interviewees, the most frequently-discussed topics become evident, as 
listed below: 
 Training/education (clearly the highest frequency) 
 The Mumbai threat 
 Joint units  
 Fire as a weapon  
 Interdependencies 
The graphs match well with the expertise of the speakers and the line of 
questioning, which was adjusted slightly for each interview.  As far as commonalties, 
both Pfeifer and the police source agree that NYC emergency responders must consider 
breaking points, or thresholds that would meet the limits of respective agencies’ abilities.  
“We need an honest assessment of capacity, capabilities and delivery,” Pfeifer said. The 
two mentioned independently that terrorists can easily shift from improvised explosive 
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devices (IEDs) to improvised incendiary devices (IIDs), and that a Mumbai-style attack 
in NYC would be too quick and dynamic for current response matrices.   
The key finding, which may or may not, contrast with the idea of a dedicated 
interagency response unit, calls for respective agency-wide awareness and training for a 
Mumbai-style event, from the command to unit level.  “Whether its borough command or 
a deputy chief, I don’t think it will make a difference,” said Joe Pfeifer, who took a top-
down approach, “what matters above all is situational awareness at the citywide level.”  
The police source’s primary aim was to work from the ground up: “[My] first choice 
would be to train up all members of service.”  The police source envisioned patrol 
officers engaging terrorists quickly instead of using a defensive containment strategy.  
Both men are addressing the same issue from different angles (command versus field), in 
consideration of intense time limitations.    
Joe Pfeifer also said:  
I think, as I’ve talked about network command, or the ability to connect 
the operation centers, that two things happening: the hastily-formed 
network at the scene, where responders need to figure out what to 
do…within incident command structure.  And [two], we have the ability 
for networks, or EOCs, to connect and to give a large picture of what’s 
happening at the ‘local scene.’  Without that, you are lost and will have no 
idea if its one terrorist, or ten terrorists, or whatever the case may be. 
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III. CASE STUDY, TRENDS, AND ISSUES  
A. CASE STUDY OF ACTIVE-SHOOTER INCIDENTS INVOLVING FIRE 
The most notable examples of siege- or barricade-style terrorist assaults in recent 
years, which include firearms, fire, and explosives, are the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 
November 2008 and the Beslan School Massacre in Russia that occurred in September 
2004.  Also, the Columbine School massacre received a cursory examination due to its 
operational significance.  Lastly, an incident that occurred in NYC 15 years ago, known 
at the Freddy’s Fashion Mart massacre (fire), will also be briefly explored.  Columbine 
and Freddy’s may not qualify as acts of terrorism, by strict definitions, but to emergency 
personnel responding to these incidents, caused by emotionally disturbed persons as 
opposed to rationally-minded terrorists, the issues are identical.   
1. Mumbai Attacks, 2008 
In November 2008, 10 men from the Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT) executed a series of commando-style attacks in Mumbai, killing almost 200 
people and wounding over 300 (RAND, 2009).  The group targeted a mix of critical 
infrastructure and high-profile, soft targets, including hotels, a café, and a Jewish center.  
During the three-day ordeal, first responders were directly targeted with automatic 
weapons, grenades and IEDs (FDNY, The Mumbai Terrorist Attack, 2009).   
From a geo-political perspective, the success of the Mumbai attacks may lead to 
more terrorist events in the future, making all Western targets more vulnerable, especially 
New York City.  There are several geographic, cultural, and economic similarities 
between NYC and Mumbai suggesting that an attack may occur in the Big Apple.  
Mumbai is considered India’s commercial and entertainment center, and the nation’s 
“Wall Street,” and even its Milan, referring to its thriving fashion industry (Rand, 2009, 
p. 1).  NYC, the home to eight million inhabitants, is the de facto capital of American 
culture and media, with hundreds of cultural and economic icons, including the New 
York Stock Exchange, Times Square, the SoHo retail fashion district, corporate 
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headquarters, and several museums.  Also, the NYC area, technically an archipelago, is 
easily accessible from the sea (similar to Mumbai), providing terrorists with countless 
entry points to avoid police at bridge and tunnel crossings; limited roadways connecting 
the boroughs could also slow emergency responders.  While testifying before the House 
Committee on Homeland Security, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond W. 
Kelly said that the similarities of NYC compared to Mumbai, described as dense, 
relatively-unprotected urban areas, could allow terrorists to establish strategic choke 
points to impede responses (Times of India, 2009). 
During the Mumbai attacks, LeT knew very well that an attack on Western targets 
in India would intensify media coverage, which experts, such as Bruce Hoffman, for 
example, repeatedly state is terrorists’ primary goal.  While commenting on the Mumbai 
attacks, the United States Fire Administration’s (USFA) Emergency Management and 
Response—Information and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) said, “They (LeT) were able 
to use a small number of attackers to achieve a spectacular event” (EMR-ISAC, 2008).  
Due to the “spectacular” success of Mumbai, from the terrorists’ perspective, the fire 
service must prepare as more attacks are likely.  “Given that the terrorists seek to 
maximize the psychological impact of the attacks, we can expect that future attacks will 
aim at both large-scale casualties and symbolic targets,” according to a Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report, “The jihadists have stated, and the Mumbai attack 
demonstrates, the determination of the terrorists to seek high body counts, go after iconic 
targets, and cause economic damage” (CRS, 2009, p. 21).       
Despite the gunfire and other dangers, the Mumbai Fire Brigade continued to 
rescue trapped hostages and fight fires in the hotels through interior attacks, and by using 
exterior ladders placed at windows to extract hostages.  “Mumbai fire chief Anil Sawaant 
and senior firefighter Pratab Karguppikar were honored for braving gunfire and flames 
during repeated trips in a cage attached to a fire truck ladder to rescue dozens trapped on 
the hotel's higher floors,” according to an Associated Press story: “The men used their 




safety” (Peachey, 2008).  The fire chief described his experience: “Luckily for us, he [the 
terrorist] did not turn in our direction and we continued fighting the fire” (The Hindu, 
2008).   
Also, with no equipment or training to operate in a combat situation, Mumbai 
firefighters fought an interior attack on the intentionally-set hotel fires with a commando 
escort—within earshot of gunfire.  “It was not easy to work in such conditions,” an 
anonymous firefighter said, “there is a risk while fighting fires but in this case there was 
the added risk of bullets” (The Hindu, 2008).  As military commandos and police were 
moving hostages through back exits, the Mumbai Fire Brigade was tasked with saving 
guests whose rooms were ablaze (IBN Live, 2008), despite the possibility that the 
firefighters would be discovered by the terrorists.   
In response to the Mumbai attacks, firefighters from the Mumbai Fire Brigade are 
being trained to provide security.  Firefighters were trained as “commandos” to provide 
protection at the 2010 Commonwealth Games in India (Schlink, 2009), which hosted 
about 5,000 athletes from former and current British colonies.  “We feel that firemen who 
are well-built can be selected for commando training so that they can offer initial 
resistance,” said New Delphi Municipal Council (NDMC) Chairman Parimal Rai 
(Schlink, 2009).   
At the regional level, India is also creating firefighter assault forces.  Jija Hari 
Singh, the Director General of Police of India’s Karnataka State Fire and Emergency 
Services, has formed a team of “Fire Commandos.”  “We have decided to form a 
commando force in the Fire Services’ department to cope with any Mumbai-like 
situation,” Mr. Singh told the New Indian Express, “we have already trained a batch of 35 
new recruits and another batch is already undergoing training” (Ammembala, 2009).  The 
fire commandos are being trained to fight fires, handle collapses, and mitigate hazardous-
materials’ incidents under combat situations.  John Giduck, a consultant to law 
enforcement, federal agencies and the military, and the author of Terror at Beslan: a 
Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America’s Schools, makes a statement, though 
controversial, that is consistent with the expanding role of Indian firefighters. He states:  
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“The single most crucial aspect of preparedness for all of America’s tactical operators, 
firefighters and paramedics is the need to train to rescue and to kill (if necessary) to save 
lives” (Giduck, 2005). 
2. Beslan School Massacre, 2004 
In 2004, Chechen separatists used a barricade-style attack on a Russian school in 
a small town in the North Caucus region.  On September 1, the traditional start of the 
school year, called the Day of Knowledge, about 50 Islamist terrorists stormed Belsan’s 
School Number One in North Ossetia-Alania (Giduck, 2005, p. 115).  The terrorists took 
advantage of the large family turnout on the first day of school to maximize their hostage 
count (about 1,200) and herded most of the hostages into a small gymnasium that was 
then rigged with bombs (McDaniel & Ellis, 2009, p. 24).  The siege lasted three days, and 
in the end, almost 400 people were killed, with over half children, and 700 were wounded 
(Giduck).  Esquire magazine writer C. J. Chivers called the Beslan attack “a horrifying 
innovation in human brutality” (Chivers, 2007). 
The threat of firearms and explosives delayed first responders and the military 
from gaining access to over 1,000 hostages, who were kept in inhumane conditions 
during the ordeal.  The siege concluded with explosions and a large fire that caused the 
gymnasium, where most of the hostages were held, to collapse.  It is still unclear how the 
roof of the gym caught fire, but implications for the fire service are apparent.  About 160 
of the hostages were killed by fire—more than half of the total (Klussmann, 2005).  Other 
reports concurred with the primary cause of death; the explosion, and the subsequent fire 
and collapse, caused the majority of the “human injury” (Chivers, 2007).  Regardless of 
the cause, fire has complicated many barricade hostage events.   
Numerous reports criticize the initial fire response.  Fire units, who arrived two 
hours into the incident, only brought 53 gallons of water and lacked fittings to connect 
pumpers to Beslan hydrants (Murphy, 2005).  “No matter what ignited the terrible blaze, 
a bungled firefighting effort may have led to more deaths.  Not only did firefighters hold 
back in the face of the gunfire, but they initially also didn’t have enough water,” 
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according to a Los Angeles Times editorial (Murphy, 2005).  Other reports claim that no 
firefighting equipment was staged and few ambulances were available (Chivers, 2007).   
The timing of the explosions on the third day could not have been worse for 
paramedics from the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations.  After negotiations with 
Russian authorities, the terrorists agreed to allow bodies of those killed on the first day to 
be removed from where they were piled outside a window.  When the explosions went 
off, the terrorists may have believed that the body removals were a diversion meant to 
place commandos in a “strategic position,” and that an attack on the school was imminent 
(Ferency, 2009).  The terrorists fired on the two paramedics that were removing the 
bodies, and one was killed.   
The FDNY can learn a valuable lesson from a review of Russian special forces 
during the Beslan siege.  “Compounding these operational mistakes was a strategic 
failure on the part of Russian security forces to become a learning organization,” said 
Peter Forster, a professor of political science at Penn State, in the journal Homeland 
Security Affairs, “the Beslan crisis exposed the limits of integrating prior experiences to 
institutional learning within Russian intelligence and security forces, thus precluding 
enhanced preparedness” (Forster, 2006, p. 2).  
3. Columbine School Massacre, 1999 
At the Columbine High School shooting in 1999, the atrocities of two deranged 
teenagers lacking a coherent political cause may not fit the strict definition of terrorism, 
but that distinction is not as important to the first responders who faced assault-rifle fire, 
and the possibly of secondary devices, incendiaries, and explosives, including car bombs.  
When it was over, 13 people were killed (12 students and a teacher), and dozens were 
seriously injured (Toppo, 2009).  “Terrorist-style assaults compound the unusual risks 
associated with a major incident,” according to a United States Fire Administration 
(USFA) report on Columbine.  “Gunfire, incendiaries, explosives, and secondary devices 
magnify the risks to responders. There is a great likelihood of mass casualties and of 
hostage taking, both of which compound tactical response and operations,” the USFA 
report stated (USFA, 1999, p. 2). 
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The USFA called for joint FD/PD units immediately after the Columbine incident.  
“It would have been of great benefit if the SWAT teams, EOD technicians, and fire/EMS 
personnel at Columbine had been able to train in joint operations” (USFA, p. 31).  The 
paper mentioned that one benefit of joint operations is that medical personnel or 
firefighters directly assigned to SWAT units could immediately treat law-enforcement 
casualties. 
The USFA report proposes improvements to fire and police response at active 
shooter, multi-hazard events, including training specialized fire department personnel, 
and a need for better understanding of special law enforcement units, and how they will 
impact fire/EMS operations. “This is best accomplished through joint planning and 
training between law enforcement and fire and EMS services” (p. 33).  According to the 
anonymous police source for this paper, one of the biggest lessons related to the 
Columbine incident for law enforcement is the need to move quickly: “Think about 
Columbine, one of the biggest arguments, and some of the biggest lawsuits today, are due 
to the fact that they waited” (anonymous personal communication, October 9, 2010).   
The Columbine shooting is notable for both what occurred, as well as for what 
may have occurred. The two boys planned the attack for more than a year, and made over 
100 bombs, including gasoline-based incendiary devices, which were placed in their 
vehicles. Some experts claim these were meant to kill first responders (USFA, 1999).  
Also, the two boys placed propane IEDs in the school’s cafeteria and kitchen with the 
intention of killing hundreds of students (Toppo, 2009).  Fortunately, for the survivors 
and response personnel, none of the poorly-constructed devices detonated.   
4. Freddy’s Market Attack, 1995 
In December 1995, Freddy’s Fashion Mart, a clothing store in the Harlem 
neighborhood of Manhattan, became the horrific scene of a racially-motivated, anti-
Semitic assault by a 51-year-old laborer which ended with eight people dead, including 
the gunman (MacFarquhar, 1998, p. B14).  The attack targeted a Jewish store owner, who 
refused to renew a sublease to a locally-owned record store (MacFarquhar, 1998, p. B14).  
Ironically, the building was owned by a nearby church, the United House of Prayer for 
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All People, but that fact was lost on protesters and the gunman, who picketed Freddy’s 
for weeks leading up to the incident.  Freddy’s massacre is notable as emergency 
responders faced gunfire, incendiaries, fire and intense smoke as they extinguished fire, 
and attempted to rescue the hostages.   
In 1995, FDNY Deputy Chief Mike McPartland was a captain and the company 
commander of Ladder Company 19 in the Bronx.  On the day of the Freddy’s incident, 
McPartland was working one tour in Engine Company 59, which was the first FDNY unit 
to arrive on the scene.  McPartland and his men responded to a reported fire on 125th 
Street, and the only critical information he received from dispatchers was to “be advised, 
PD activity in the area” (personal communication, January 17, 2011).  When the engine 
reached the intersection of the incident, McPartland knew immediately that he had a 
legitimate fire (personal communication, January 17, 2011).  Patrolmen stationed on the 
corner tried to block the FDNY vehicle from getting through, but the fire engine pushed 
through the barricade anyway and found a working hydrant, as the officer and firefighters 
knew that they had to address the fire and thick smoke pouring out the building if they 
were going to save anyone trapped inside.   
While using the store fronts as cover, McPartland and his team crawled to the 
front of the building, as police fired into the store.  Due to the advanced stage of the fire 
in Freddy’s, which occupied the first floor of a two-story building, McPartland suspected 
that the gunman was already dead or incapacitated.  He then ordered his crew to stretch a 
hoseline to the front of the store, where they began their attack on the fire.  NYPD 
Emergency Services Unit (ESU) police officers, who initially discouraged McPartland 
and his crew from operating, eventually said, “We’ll give you cover,” and positioned 
themselves to either side of the nozzle team and fire officer, protecting the fire crew with 
bulletproof shields until the heat and smoke forced the police officers to retreat.  With no 
police protection, McPartland lead his team into the store to reach the heart of the fire, 
and even found the dead gunman, until the FDNY incident commander ordered Engine 
59 out of the building due to indications of a possible building collapse.  When conditions 
allowed firefighters to return, the majority of hostage victims were found in the 
basement, overcome by smoke inhalation (personal communication, January 17, 2011).   
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Reflecting on the Freddy’s incident, Chief McPartland said that police and fire 
commanders did not share a common command post, and that a lack of information while 
responding in, and during the incident, endangered fire units (personal communication, 
January 17, 2011).  Fifteen years after Freddy’s, many of the inter-agency operational and 
communication deficiencies revealed during the incident have yet to be resolved, despite 
the fact that the FDNY and NYPD have been responding to what is now called Mumbai-
style attacks (in this case one assailant) for many years.   
B. CASE-STUDY FINDINGS AND COMMONALITIES 
 All four incidents prove that firefighters and emergency personnel may 
operate in a chaotic, active-shooter environment to address life-safety, 
regardless of a lack of standard operating procedures or protocols.   
 Two of the four incidents occurred at schools, and three of the four attacks 
targeted soft targets in densely-populated urban areas. 
 Interagency training, along with the proper equipment, can enhance 
emergency responders.  
 Interagency communications protocols must be pre-established to ensure 
that all responding personnel receive critical information expeditiously.  
 Fire, incendiary devices and explosives can greatly complicate, slow down 
and confuse operations.  
 Emergency-responder inaction will endanger hostages at terrorist incidents 
C. SWARMING, NETWAR, AND HYBRID WARFARE  
The tactics described in the case studies are consistent with a wider tactical shift 
in combat from non-state actors.  Swarming, an attack method where a small strike force 
forms quickly to surprise and overwhelm an adversary or target, is found in a wide array 
of natural, military, political, and social contexts.  Because terrorist swarming tactics are 
a relatively new threat, borrowed from successful insurgency tactics in the twentieth 
century, government reports or academic literature on the role of firefighters at active-
shooter terrorist attacks is limited.  The same military academics that introduced the term 
“swarming” in the 1990s have expanded on the idea with “netwar,” a mode of warfare 
characterized by a networked, multi-tiered approach to conflict.  Other theorists describe 
this emerging method of attack as “hybrid warfare.”  Whether presented as swarming, 
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netwar, or hybrid war, it is important that first responders study paramilitary-style 
terrorism.  First responders will likely come across this threat more often in the near 
future.  
1. Swarming 
The emerging military doctrine of swarming is categorized by quick, coordinated 
strikes from small units (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 2000, p. vii).  Swarming is considered the 
fourth military doctrine, after chaotic melee (linear formations that quickly dissolve), 
brute-force massing (geometric formations that attack in waves) and nimble maneuvers 
(complex, synchronized “nonlinear” movements) (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 2000, pp. 10–
23).  Swarming has two fundamental requirements: one, to be able to strike at an 
adversary from multiple directions; and, two, separate striking forces forming a “sensory 
organization,” providing the surveillance and “synoptic-level observations” necessary in 
the creation and maintenance of “topsight” (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 2000, p. 22).  In other 
words, swarming units do more than engage a target independently; they rely on each 
other, and sometimes their superiors, for situational awareness through instant, wireless 
communications.  
Swarming is carried out in four stages (Edwards, 2000, p. xvi): 




During the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008, for example, many 
sources state that the terrorists’ actions were well rehearsed and that modern 
communications and public information sources enabled their operations.  Swarming 
allows “[a] myriad [of] small units that are normally kept dispersed turn to converge on a 
target from all directions, conduct and attack and then redisperse to prepare for the next 
operation” (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 2001, p. 333).  Loosely-networked terrorist groups and 
improvements in communication technologies have enabled swarming tactics: “swarming 
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requires complex organizational innovations and more information structuring and 
processing capabilities than do earlier paradigm” (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 2001, p. 21).   
a. Swarming in Nature  
Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways and be wise. (New 
American Standard Bible, 2010, Proverbs 6.6) 
As the term swarming implies, paramilitary swarm tactics are similar to 
those found in nature by social animals and insects.  For example, ants behave and attack 
in a coordinated way despite the absence of hierarchal leadership.  Instead, each ant 
adjusts its behavior, including the urge to attack, based on chemical cues from 
pheromones released by their neighbors, acting locally with global consequences, a 
hallmark of complexity science.  When converging on a threat, ant formations quickly 
disintegrate into mass swarms that seemingly blanket an opponent from all directions.   
How ants communicate, and then act, is relevant to the study of 
paramilitary terrorist attacks, even when the ants are engaged is food searches and not 
warfare.  Experiments on a species of ants in Argentina prove that the ants were able to 
quickly figure out the quickest route to a food source.  Ants that returned to the colony 
first, the research showed, compared to the ants that took a more circuitous route, had 
more influence on the paths of succeeding foragers, who, on average, followed the 
quicker path (Fisher, 2009, p. 37).  Similarly, terrorists operating during active-shooter 
attacks will similarly communicate with each other, and possibly a central leader, through 
verbal or non-verbal cues, or even wireless devices, as they adjust to challenges from law 
enforcement or shift to targets of greater opportunity.      
The examination of ant swarming must include defense measures.  Aside 
from avoidance or evacuation, animals of any size or ferocity have no way to defend 
against the relentless onslaught of an ant swarming attack, with one notable exception—
another ant swarm.  Ants wage “territorial wars against other ants,” according to a RAND 
booklet, Swarming & The Future of Conflict (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000).  “These wars 
are frequently protracted, and of an operational complexity that mirrors human wars in 
striking ways” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 26).   
  27
Typically, these insects employ “blanketing” tactics when foraging outside 
the hive or nest, striking at their adversaries or prey from all directions.  
The goal is to overwhelm any cohesive defenses that might be mustered.  
Although these insects are often more in linear formations, they are quite 
adept at shifting into a swarming mode at the point of engagement.  In the 
case of ants, this behavior has been called “swarm raiding” (see 
Holldobler and Wilson, 1994).  (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 25) 
Bees also attack as a swarm, and unlike ants that react to mostly chemical 
cues; bee scouts, acting as ad hoc leaders, will inform other bees of the quickest path to 
their target through their behavior, namely, by flying quickly in a straight line, inspiring 
others to follow suit (Fisher, pp. 29–30).  Figure eights, round movements, and tail-
wagging are “dances” that bees use to communicate food sources, distances, and other 
information (Polarization, 2011). Another interesting difference between the two species 
is that repeated attacks from individual bees are not possible as they die soon after 
discharging their stingers, analogous to coordinated suicide bombers.  As discussed, 
convergence tactics are not limited to insect world. 
b. Swarming in Human Conflict  
Swarming has been used in human warfare for thousands of years by 
various players.  In 329 B.C., Alexander the Great’s Macedonian forces faced swarming 
attacks from the nomadic Scythians, who used horse archers to quickly assemble and 
strike Roman phalanxes in the northeastern border of the Persian Empire, according to 
military academic Sean Edwards (2000, p. 14).  Horse archers were also used by the 
Parthians to defeat the Roman army in the Battle of Carrhae (53 B.C.), where the 
mobility of Parthian horses and the range of the bows gave Parthians a tactical advantage 
(Edwards, p. 20), even against Roman cavalry.  Edwards calls the thirteenth century 
Mongols under Genghis Khan the “ultimate swarmers,” based on their conquests that 
spanned from Korea to Germany, considered “the largest continuous land empire ever” 
(p. 28).  Factors that contributed to Khan’s success can be applied directly to what 
enables groups that use swarm tactics today, including decentralized command, superior 
situational awareness, mobility and long-range weaponry (Edwards, p. 28).  Also, the 
Mongols needed open terrain to maneuver a large number of mounted soldiers (Edwards, 
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p. 30); similarly, paramilitary terrorists would be enabled by urban sprawl.  In more 
recent times, less powerful actors have used swarming methods against more established 
nation-states.  For example, in the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), South Africans used a 
cultural emphasis on horsemanship and the range of Mauser rifles to strike British forces 
quickly and from distance (Edwards, p. 39).   
A naval example of swarming is just as relevant, especially in this case, 
due the fact that the swarming methods were eventually defeated.  During World War II, 
German U-boat submarine groups, called “wolf packs,” took inspiration from their lupine 
namesake by coordinating highly-successful attacks, at least in the beginning of the war, 
on Allied shipping in what became known as the Battle of the Atlantic.  After scout U-
boats made contact with a shipping fleet, wolf packs converged in loose formations of 
five or more, as they targeted quarry, and shifted to swarm-like strikes as they converged 
from multiple locations, according to Edwards (2000, p. 43), enabled by mobility and 
theater-wide communications, namely radio.  U-boats attacked from the surface, usually 
at night, as Allied sonar could detect the vessels under water but not on the surface.  Later 
in the war, Allied use of radar and depth charges, combined with the extended range of 
air cover that closed the security gap in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, shifted the 
advantage away from the wolf packs (Edwards, 2000, p. 47).  It was a combination of 
technological advancement, advanced operations and communications, and collaboration 
between air and sea resources that defeated the U-boat swarm—an important lesson for 
today’s emergency responders.   
c. Terrorist Swarming  
As the natural and historical examples show, swarming is not necessarily a 
new doctrine, but terrorist application of this military method is considered an innovation. 
Shortly after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) 
intelligence division released a comparative study of the Mumbai and Lahore cricket 
team attacks, stating that there is evidence of a “‘shift in tactics’ from suicide bombers to 
a commando-style military assault with small teams of highly trained, heavily armed 
operatives launching simultaneous, sustained attacks” (Times of India, 2009).  This 
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interpretation suggests that terrorists are moving from large-scale, weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) hazmat attacks, to more flexible strikes with conventional weapons 
combined with unconventional tactics.  Swarming affords terrorists with the freedom of 
tactical autonomy that can be enhanced by communications with a hierarchal command 
structure, affording them periodic updates or instructions from superiors.  “Swarming is 
going to be more a function of cultivating an appropriate turn of mind and a supple, 
networked military form of organization than it will be a search for new technologies,” 
said Arquilla & Rondfeldt (2000, p. 5).  The swarming concept is best described by Mao 
Tse Tung’s strategic dictum on guerilla warfare, which encourages “strategic 
centralization, tactical decentralization” (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 2000, p. 21).  
2. Netwar and Hybrid Warfare 
The same military academics that introduced swarming have built on the idea 
with a more comprehensive look at network-based conflict in the information age, which 
they have dubbed “netwar.”  Netwar, or networked-based conflict and crime, “will 
become major phenomena in the decades ahead…[including] transnational terrorist 
groups” (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 2001, p. 6).  At first glance, it would appear that the 
name refers to internet-based conflict or cyberwar, but netwar in its widest context 
acknowledges five categories that networked-based, non-hierarchical organizations 
require to be viable: technological, social, narrative, organizational, and doctrinal 
cohesion.  As an attack method, netwar is similar to swarming, characterized by 
seemingly leaderless groups moving quickly on targets.   
Within the scope of terrorist attack methods, netwar provides a useful lens for first 
responders, who must understand and adapt to this emerging threat.  Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt acknowledge the effectiveness of this attack method: “In part, the success of 
netwar may be explained by its very novelty—much as earlier periods of innovation in 
military affairs have seen new practices triumphant until an appropriate response is 
discovered” (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 2001, p. ix)  With a study of recent terrorist 
swarming attacks worldwide, American  emergency responders have an opportunity to  
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find that “appropriate response” to complex active-shooter terrorism before attacks occur 
on American soil, but the solution may require leaders to drastically alter their perception 
of organizationally-isolated response models.     
What will likely come out of an examination of terrorist swarming strategies is 
the realization that the best way to match a network is with a network.  “Networked 
threats require a response from either a network or a hybrid (that is, a blend of a hierarchy 
and a network).” (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 2001, p. 124).  A fire-police network, 
decentralized at the incident command level, along with a robust communication link 
with superiors, will empower first responders during a network-based, active-shooter 
attack, which will improve survival odds for hostages or endangered persons.    
Lastly, Frank Hoffman, a military theorist, proposes that future conflict will be 
characterized by a “convergence” of regular and irregular warfare, combatants and 
noncombatants, physical and psychological dimensions, and kinetic versus non-kinetic 
forces described as “hybrid warfare” (F. Hoffman, 2009, p. 34). In hybrid wars, 
conventional and unconventional attack methods will blur into well-coordinated strikes, 
creating an effect well beyond the sum of the components, which greatly increases both 
lethality and impact.  Hybrid warfare will be used by not just nations, according to 
military experts, but also non-state actors such as terrorist organizations.  “Hybrid threats 
incorporate a full range of modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, 
irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and 
coercion, and criminal disorder,” Frank Hoffman said (2009, p. 36).   
Though this new theory is military in nature, many of the issues closely parallel 
the issues that first responder agencies will face in preparation for, and response to, multi-
location, multi-dimensional paramilitary terrorist assaults.  In these attacks, terrorists will 
pack much more than small arms in their arsenals, requiring an emergency response that 
also blurs traditional lines.  Frank Hoffman offered the following quote from John 
Arquilla in a 2009 Joint Force Quarterly article: “While history provides some useful 
examples to stimulate strategic thought about such problems, coping with networks that 
can fight in so many different ways—sparking myriad, hybrid forms of conflict—is going 
to require some innovative thinking” (Hoffman, p. 38).   
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The following quote captures netwar as something more than technological 
progress, but an emerging form of organization and doctrine:  
‘It takes a network to fight networks.’ Governments wishing to counter 
netwar terrorism will need to adopt organizational designs and strategies 
like those of their adversaries.  This does not mean mirroring the 
opponent, but rather learning to draw on the same design principles of 
network forms.  These principles depend to some extent upon 
technological innovation, but mainly on a willingness to innovate 
organizationally and doctrinally and by building new mechanisms for 
interagency and multijurisdictional cooperation. (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 
2001, p. 54) 
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IV. MUMBAI-STYLE TERRORISM, AN EMERGING THREAT 
Scholars, journalists and terrorism experts claim that terrorists are shifting from 
large-scale, CBRN attacks towards Mumbai-style strikes, corroborated by recent terror 
warnings for Europe and the U.S.  Lead terrorism and counterinsurgency expert Bruce 
Hoffman, a professor at Georgetown University, co-wrote a report titled Assessing the 
Terrorist Threat in September 2010 (Bergen & B. Hoffman).  In the paper, the success, as 
measured in media coverage, of the Mumbai terror attacks was acknowledged.  “The 
long, drawn-out assault in Mumbai produced round the clock coverage around the globe, 
something other terrorist groups want to emulate,” according a 2008 report from the 
Bipartisan Policy Center (p. 28).  Just two weeks later, Richard Norton-Taylor and Owen 
Bowcott reported in The Guardian that European authorities announced that a Mumbai-
style commando raid on European targets was foiled by drone attacks on terrorist camps 
in Pakistan; U.S. targets were also threatened (Norton-Taylor & Bowcott, 2010; National 
Terror Alert Response Center, 2010).  Two months later, John Arquilla (2010) wrote an 
editorial for a San Francisco paper anticipating that “in all likelihood, the terrorists will 
continue preparing to mount small-scale swarming assaults along the lines of the Mumbai 
model.”  And days before Christmas, India issued a terrorism alert for Mumbai warning 
that another paramilitary terror assault was planned by Lashkar-e-Taiba, who carried out 
the 2008 attacks, and that the operatives may already be in place (Guha, 2010). 
The United States has seen a rash of active-shooter incidents in the past few years 
(Virginia Tech, Binghampton immigration office, Fort Hood, etc.), both criminally and 
terrorist motivated, causing many first responders and military organizations to release 
tactical and work-place guidance on how to handle these incidents.  In response, the 
United States Army has released a guide to its personnel on how to react to an active-
shooter incident.  In the guide, an active-shooter is defined as “an armed person who has 
used deadly physical force on other persons and continues to do so while having 
unrestricted access to additional victims” (United States Army, 2009).   
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A key component of active-shooter terrorism is the desire for the attackers to 
maximize causality counts on these “victims,” but a high body count is a means to an 
end, and not the primary objective.  “Terrorism may be seen as a violent act that is 
conceived specifically to attract attention, and then, through the publicity it generates, to 
communicate a message,” said terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman (2006, p. 174).  
“Terrorism is theater,” said Brian Jenkins in a ground-breaking paper, who has been 
studying terrorism since the 1970s, “terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to 
attract the attention of the electric media and the international press” (Hoffman, 2006, 
p.174).  The police expert interviewed for this paper, who will remain anonymous, said 
that low-tech, easy-to-do prolonged terror attacks creates a tremendous ripple effect 
(anonymous personal communication, October 9, 2010).  The police source added that 
terrorism active-shooter events are usually carried out by multiple-shooters, contrary to a 
wider trend in criminally motivated active-shooter attacks that usually involve just one 
shooter (personal communication, 2010a).   
A. MUMBAI-STYLE ATTACK DEFINED 
The intelligence wing of the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness has defined the Mumbai-style terrorist attack, in draft form, as the 
following (Esposito, Newman, Ward, & Carroll, 2011): 
A swift-moving, coordinated terrorist attack using either barricade- or 
siege-like assault methods by several operatives, enabled by wireless 
communications, converging on a series of targets (proximate or remote) 
in a high-density, urban area, combining an dynamic array of weapons, 
such as firearms and explosives, including the deliberate use of fire and 
smoke, in an attempt to maximize civilian casualties and media exposure, 
while confusing and overwhelming local responders over a possible multi-
day operational period if not neutralized.     
B. FIRE AS A WEAPON, LIMITATIONS OF ALL-HAZARDS 
Internationally, the Mumbai attacks continue a trend in modern terrorism to use 
fire as a weapon, from the Irish Republican Army, who used fire and homemade 
explosives for almost three decades (Oppenheimer & English, 2009) to the 9/11 World 
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Trade Center attacks, possibly the biggest improvised incendiary device (IID) ever used.  
During the Mumbai attacks, “[LeT] terrorists used fire as both a weapon and a 
diversionary tactic in their deadly siege of the Taj Mahal and Oberoi-Trident hotels,” said 
Scott Sweetow, an assistant special agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms and Explosives (2009, p. 33).  Though not a component of CBRNE, first 
responders should not underestimate the destructiveness or impact of incendiary attacks: 
an equal amount of gasoline, by weight, releases 15 times the energy as TNT, according 
to physicist Richard A. Muller in his book, Physics for Future Presidents: the Science 
Behind the Headlines (2008, p. 20).     
Fires at terrorist attacks are much different than routine fires.  FDNY Deputy 
Assistant Chief Stephen Raynis, who wrote his master’s thesis for the Naval Postgraduate 
School on IIDs as terrorist weapons, said that terrorists may use any of a number of 
accelerants or metals to start a fire, and that casualties and extensive damage to critical 
infrastructure need not be caused by CBRNE weapons (2006, p. 39).  The lesson here is 
that terrorist attacks are not just CBRNE-related.  Fire may be the primary or secondary 
weapon, and despite the “all-hazards” movement, a terrorism response to an active 
incident that involves firearms, fire, incendiaries and explosives is much different that a 
routine fire or hazmat emergency.  All-hazards doctrine makes two assumptions that are 
contrary to active-shooter terrorist incidents: one, firearms do not fit into any of the 
CBRNE categories; and two, the approach does not consider a human, adaptive enemy 
who will manipulate the battlespace for their own advantage at the detriment of first 
responders.   
According to all-hazards doctrine, the dangers found at routine fires or hazmat 
incidents are considered similar enough to the consequences of a terrorist response that 
the training should essentially overlap.  According to a policy studies professor, Dr. 
William L. Waugh (2004), at Georgia State University: 
All hazards does not literally mean being prepared for any and all hazards 
that might manifest themselves in a particular community, state or nation. 
What it does mean is that there are things that commonly occur in many 
kinds of disasters, such as the need for emergency warning or mass 
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evacuation, that can be addressed in a general plan and that that plan can 
provide the basis for responding to unexpected events.  
Another emergency preparedness expert was quoted in a Homeland Security 
Affairs article, “The argument assumes that while terrorism may be somewhat different 
from other emergencies, it may not be that much different,” (Bellavita, 2006, p. 4).  
Waugh (2004) claims that all-hazards planning provides a “basic framework” for a wide 
variety of incidents and addresses the most likely events to occur.  It is hard to argue that 
much of first responder procedural, communications, and training strategies mesh with an 
array of incident types, but that can be said of the most basic instruction that firefighters 
and police receive during the first year at their respective academies, without the need to 
name it an unique doctrine.  According to Dr. Waugh, challenges to the universality of 
all-hazards doctrine are based on “a fundamental misunderstanding of the model.” 
(2004); but current terrorist trends dictate otherwise.   
Unfortunately, terrorist attack methods are not static.  Less than two months after 
the release of Waugh’s paper, “Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model,” terrorists at the 
Belsan School massacre rewrote the book on terrorist attacks.  From 2004 onward, first 
responders worldwide would have to change their perceptions of what a terrorist response 
was, and now include an ongoing, active-shooter environment in their own cognitive and 
procedural models.  For example, William Bird, a branch chief for the DHS Intelligence 
and Analysis’s Homeland Counterterrorism Division, presented a seminar on Mumbai-
type attacks at the FDNY training academy in September 2010.  The PowerPoint 
presentation, on which the lecture was based, stated, “Fire and fire related injuries killed 
nearly as many victims as gunfire” (DHS, 2010, slide 33).  Mr. Bird concluded the 
segment on fire as a weapon by asking the following question: “How would FDNY 
operate if a building was on fire, but there were attackers and victims still inside?” (DHS, 
slide 33).  This document is an attempt to begin answering that very question.   
Terrorism response can be very different from routine responses when firearms, 
secondary devices, aviation fuel, booby traps, and intentional collapse hazards are 
considered.  All-hazards’ doctrine, whose origins are somewhat enigmatic, was included 
in federal documents at least by the late 1980s.  For example, the National Security 
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Decision Directive 259 (NSDD 259) was issued in February 1987 during the Reagan 
administration, and it stated: “The civil defense program will continue to support all-
hazard integrated emergency management at state and local levels, to the extent that this 
is consistent with and contributes to preparedness of the Nation in the event of an attack, 
whether nuclear or non-nuclear means” (National Security Council, 1987).  In the context 
of the waning Cold War, all-hazards can be interpreted as threats to the United States by 
nuclear or other means; also, the document places the primary responsibility in the 
response to an attack to local governments.  In 2007, a Cook County, Illinois emergency 
preparedness “disaster dictionary” defined all-hazards as “a conceptual and management 
approach that uses the same set of management arrangements to deal with all types of 
hazards (natural, man-made, complex)” (Suburban Emergency Management Project, 
2007).  With shifting terrorist tactics, generalized training is no longer appropriate for all 
terrorist incident types.    
C. ABSENCE OF FIRE IN CURRENT TRAINING AND PREPAREDNESS 
What is conspicuously absent from law enforcement preparations for a Mumbai-
type terrorist event is consideration of fire as part of the weapons mix.  The Wall Street 
Journal ran an article in late December 2010 on NYPD’s exercise simulation to gauge its 
preparedness for a so-called Mumbai-style attack in Manhattan (Gardiner, 2010).  During 
the scenario, terrorists simultaneously struck several diverse sites (both functionally and 
geographically), including the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s New York headquarters, 
a federal courthouse, Macy’s and Bellevue Hospital.  According to the article, police 
counterterrorism officials are “comfortable that they were prepared for any type of 
terrorist attack,” despite the fact that fire, smoke, low visibility, water sources, and 
building collapses were not considered in the scenario, based on the article (Gardiner, 
2010).  Also, the FDNY was not invited to the simulation, even though fire will likely be 
used by terrorists in a real event.  In fact, the word “fire” was not mentioned once in the 
article (except in the phrase “opened fire”), suggesting that fire as a tactic was not 
strongly considered during the simulations.    
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The Counterterrorism Bureau of the NYPD recently released an undated report 
titled, “Active-Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation” (NYPD, 
n.d.).  The report lists over 200 active-shooter incidents (mostly criminal in nature) 
nationwide from 1966–2010.  In the short analysis section, charts show certain data, 
including age of attackers, relationship to victims, casualty counts, how incidents were 
resolved and building type (NYPD, pp. 4–7).  In the weapons’ section, the report states 
that 36 percent of active-shooter incidents involved more than one weapon (NYPD, p. 7).  
What is absent in the report is information on how many of these incidents involved fire 
or explosives as a weapon, or how many casualties can be attributed to fire and smoke, if 
present.  Another category that may have been useful is the motive for the attack, which 
would strongly influence tactical considerations, including hostage negotiations and 
speed of engagement.   
Even the national fire service seems slow to connect Mumbai-style terrorism with 
the lethality of fire during these attacks.  An August 2010 article in Fire Chief magazine 
chronicles how firefighters in Clayton County, Georgia are now training with law 
enforcement to integrate “tactical medics” with police SWAT (special weapons and 
tactics) teams to provide injured police officers with immediate first aid and trauma care 
during insertions in hostile environments (Roberts, 2010, pp. 59–70).  The idea, which 
closely follows corpsman/medic models in the military, is to provide injured officers with 
near instantaneous medical care is laudable, but the program does not consider fire 
suppression with close medical support—a combination of skill sets that may be required 
during a Mumbai-style attack.  The tactical medic concept is not new, but Clayton 
County’s dedication to integrated units is evident as participants require additional 
equipment and training, including firearms for the medics, despite being “cost-
prohibitive” (Roberts, 2010, p. 64) and best suited for high-density urban environments.     
D. HOSTAGES 
Another important consideration is the difference between a hostage situation 
during Mumbai-style terrorist attacks and an active-shooter incident involving hostages, 
instigated by a profit, anger, mental-illness, or desperation.  In terrorist active-shooter 
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incidents, attackers will only take hostages to leverage negotiations or as a stalling tactic; 
they have no intention of releasing the hostages because the hostages ensure intense 
media coverage.   
John Giduck, a security expert who wrote the only comprehensive English-
language book on the Beslan School massacre in 2004 titled Terror at Beslan, has 
preserved several statements from Russian military leaders on the massacres.  According 
to Giduck, the experts believed that “terrorists decreasingly take hostages in the 
conventional sense; they ‘take people and then kill them.’”  Russian terrorist experts 
recommend that assault teams move quickly against a paramilitary terrorist attack: “The 
hostages’ only real opportunity for survival is during the confusion of the initial assault” 
(Giduck, p. 338).  A Department of Homeland Security Tripwire intelligence report from 
September 2010 said that during small-unit tactics, such as Mumbai, “terrorists fought to 
the death and were not open to negotiations, nor did they present a list of demands” 
(DHS, 2010).   
Ron Borsch, an emergency preparedness expert and consultant, has come up with 
a formula to track the number of “murder attempts by minute” at active-shooter incidents 
called the “stopwatch of death” (PoliceOne.com News, 2007). In his research, he studied 
data from Columbine, Virginia Tech, and the San Ysidro McDonald’s attack, among 
others.  The common finding is that the longer the duration of an active-shooter event, the 
higher the casualty count (PoliceOne.com News, 2007), regardless if it is classified as a 
terrorist- or criminally-motivated attack.   
The anonymous police expert for this paper said American law enforcement will 
lose valuable minutes in avoiding bloodshed if they think that these incidents can be 
resolved through negotiations.  Hostage-taking events by criminals or emotionally-
disturbed persons have an endgame other than the death or injury of the hostages, and the 
same cannot be said for a terrorist hostage crisis, he said (anonymous personal 
communication, October 9, 2010).  He added that if terrorists were serious about 
negotiations and a peaceful resolution, they would not be using pressure-sensitive triggers 
on explosive devices, referring to the Beslan massacre.  “These weren’t criminals.  They 
were terrorists who are at war with Russia and who took over 1,000 children, women and 
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men hostages,” according to a Los Angeles Times article on Beslan, “it was a military 
operation, and in a military operation, there are going to be collateral casualties to 
hostages and civilians” (Murphy, 2009).  As difficult as it is to accept, the FDNY must 
expect that negotiations are not the primary goal of these hostage incidents, and that they 
will likely end with mass casualties.  
E. RELIANCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (RESPONDER AND TERRORIST)  
(Concentric dispersion) the idea feature[ing] small, dispersed units held 
together with robust communications networks that only come together 
(“pulse,” to use our term) at the point and time of attack.  (Arquilla & 
Rondfelt, 2000, p. 42)  
Today’s swarm-like attacks are possible partly due to modern wireless 
telecommunications.  “The Mumbai attackers were able to locate precise landing points 
by using a Global Positioning System (GPS) for navigation,” said Charles Allen, former 
under secretary for intelligence and analysis for DHS, as part of congressional testimony 
(Sweetow, 2009). The attackers used cell phones, satellite phones, and Blackberries to 
communicate with themselves and their leadership during the three-day, multi-site 
rampage (Rabasa, Blackwill, Chalk, Cragin, Fair, Jackson et al., 2009, p. 7).  “As 
communications technologies improve, siege-style terrorist attacks will increase 
globally,” according to Arquilla, “commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology is 
available that can support a swarm’s need for the dense communication of time-urgent 
functional information” (Arquilla, 2000, p. 67). What makes the preceding quote 
extraordinary is that it was written nine years ago. 
F. NOVELTY AND AN ADAPTIVE ENEMY  
The bright-side actors may be so deeply embedded in and constrained by a 
society’s established forms of organization that many have difficulty 
becoming early innovators and adopters of a new form.  In contrast, 
nimble bad guys may have a freer, easier time acting as the cutting edge—
and reacting to them maybe be what eventually spurs the good guys to 
innovate. (Arquilla & Rondfelt, 2000, p. 313) 
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Both terrorists and emergency responders learn and adapt, and based on fewer 
organizational constraints, terrorists usually adapt and innovate faster than government 
agencies.  Terrorists think in the long-term, such as fortifying buildings (similar to 
Beslan), as they stay three or four steps ahead, which is something that needs to be 
addressed, with fire, even more so, the police source stated.  Also, he said that law 
enforcement lives by mistake, or by playing catch up, and cited the late transition to 
faster-loading 9 mm handguns from revolvers, as just one example (anonymous personal 
communication, October 9, 2010); the fire service in no different.   
From the models, we see terrorist adaptation—where we would have seen 
sophisticated IEDs, now we see substitution IIDs (improvised incendiary devices), the 
use of fire as a weapon, Joe Pfeifer said (personal communication, October 4, 2010).  
Regarding a paramilitary terrorist attack, as first responders move, the terrorists will 
move and react, possibly lighting fires beneath law enforcement on lower floors, Pfeifer 
added.  For terrorists, a move to more incendiary devices, versus IEDs, shows an ability 
to adjust, as seen with the rash of fire-bomb attacks on churches in Malaysia, Pakistan, 
and Iraq.  During the Mumbai attacks, the police source said that the terrorists 
deliberately dropped bags with IEDs among the hundreds of abandoned bags at the CST 
train station to slow down the police response because one cannot put a bomb blanket on 
every bag—“talk about a thinking enemy” (personal communication, October 9, 2010).  
During the Virginia Tech shooting, Seung-Huei Cho learned from previous attacks by 
chaining doors shut and placing misleading signs, the police expert said (anonymous 
personal communication, October 9, 2010).   
For the fire service, “we have to start to think innovatively,” Joe Pfeifer warned 
(personal communication, October 4, 2010).  “What occurs, as in the Mumbai-type of 
attack scenario, you are experiencing a novel event, especially since we have not 
experienced a Mumbai-style attack in New York, which does not match any pattern or 
past experience,” Pfeifer added (personal communication, October 4, 2010).  In regard to 
addressing commonalities, a Mumbai-type attack would be a novel event, suggesting a 
need to form taskforces, and think through possible scenarios that would not cover every 
eventuality, but would be the difference between customizing tactics versus having to 
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create something ad hoc at the scene (personal communication, October 4, 2010).  Joe 
Pfeifer concluded by challenging emergency responders to be innovative at the desktop, 
as well as on the fire ground or during a firefight (personal communication, October 4, 
2010).  
G. IMPORTANCE OF NETWORKS FROM COMMAND LEVEL TO 
OPERATING UNIT 
A concept related to swarming, namely “network-centric warfare,” rests 
on an important doctrinal notion: Victory in future battles will depend on 
more on who has the best “networks” than on who has the strongest 
“platforms.”  (Arquilla & Rondfelt, 2000, p. 60) 
Joe Pfeifer stressed the need for a networked command.  Regardless of what level 
of chief is in charge, he said that what matters is having citywide situational awareness: 
I’ve talked about network command, or the ability to connect the 
operations centers.  So we have two things happening: the hastily-formed 
network at the scene, where responders need to figure out what to do, and 
talk about it, within the incident command structure.  And then we have 
the ability for networks, or EOCs [emergency operations centers], to 
connect and to give a large picture of what’s happening at the local scene.  
Without that, you are lost and will have no idea if its one terrorist, or ten 
terrorists, or whatever the case may be. (Personal communication, October 
4, 2010) 
According the police source, NYC can handle multiple attacks simultaneously to 
a certain point, but once the incidents become spread out, it will essentially shut down the 
city, especially Manhattan (anonymous personal communication, October 9, 2010).  
Also, he said that the NYPD uses a command system similar to FDNY’s borough 




IV. INTRODUCING THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATED 
FIRE/POLICE UNITS 
A. JOINT-UNIT PROPOSAL: SWARM UNITS 
This chapter will culminate with a look at the issues related to the integrated 
fire/police unit concept, designed to address paramilitary terrorist attacks and the 
expected weapons’ mix that will used.  Integrated fire/police response teams will be 
called “SWARM units.”  SWARM is an acronym for a Syndicated, Water-enabled, 
Anti-siege, Response Matrix, meant to describe a networked emergency response 
designed to combine the unique expertise of firefighters and police officers with the 
purpose of rescuing hostages or threatened person’s by challenging terrorists in an 
environment that may include firearms, smoke, and fire, or explosives.     
With a lack of literature regarding the concept of joint fire/police units (with the 
exception of tactical-medic research), the issues related to the proposed interagency team 
were uncovered during the interviews for this paper.  All three interviews agreed with the 
idea of a SWARM unit, with certain caveats.  The police source asked rhetorically how 
the units would be formed, meaning would they stand alone as full-time integrated units, 
or would they assemble at the incident (assuming previous interaction, identical training, 
etc.) (anonymous personal communication, October 9, 2010)?  The day-to-day structure 
of SWARM units is a valid concern, best left to the dual-agency experts in that subset.  
Even with the appropriate training, the police source anticipates that the integrated team 
could not be formed and ready to enter a hostile environment fast enough for most active-
shooter incidents.  He based his opinion on case studies, and that same claim is made for 
specialized, single-agency responses, such as (NYPD) Emergency Services Units.  The 
biggest issue is time, or lack of, the police source said (anonymous personal 
communication, October 9, 2010). 
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B. BREAKING POINTS: CAPACITY, CAPABILITY AND DELIVERY  
Both Joe Pfeifer and the police expert mentioned the limitations, or breaking 
points, of the fire service and police response, respectively.  Specifically, organizational 
breaking points refer to the threshold where capacity (how much), capability (how well) 
or delivery (how quickly) is reached, which will be even less robust in a single-agency 
response.  “The danger is that you think you can handle it all by yourself, and one of 
those breaking points actually breaks,” Joe Pfeifer said.  He added that law enforcement 
and the fire service need to look at breaking points collectively on three levels (capacity, 
capability, delivery), instead of the first two, where the homeland security community 
seems to concentrate the most (personal communication, October 4, 2010). 
As an example of the delivery issue, Joe Pfeifer explained how revealing a table-
top exercise on a Mumbai-style attack was to the City of Los Angles.  On paper, the L.A. 
police department has an effective recall procedure when capacity needs to be enhanced, 
but what was learned in the exercise is that the arrival time (delivery) of recalled off-duty 
members, who make up about 75 percent of the workforce at any given time, it will be 
slower than ideal (personal communication, October 4, 2010). 
C. TRAINING 
Training promotes pre-incident innovation, according to Joe Pfeifer, and 
preparations for a Mumbai-type attack are no different.  Emergency responders must be 
armed with the knowledge, protective gear, and skills sets needed for working with other 
agencies. He added: “If you train with a SWAT team, if you dress like a SWAT team, if 
you understand how they move, how to protect yourself, and how to use barriers as 
protection, you can minimize your exposure time” (anonymous personal communication, 
October 9, 2010).  
The police source mentioned qualifications issues, but he said it is better to work 
out those details than to be unprepared for an event.  Additional training will be necessary 
for SWAT units to function properly in tight quarters, for instance.  It would be difficult 
to move a fully-armed, interagency tactical team down the average hotel hallway, which 
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would only be made more chaotic and slow with fire, smoke, noise and low light, he said 
(anonymous personal communication, October 9, 2010).  As far he knew, law 
enforcement does not train for those conditions (anonymous personal communication, 
October 9, 2010).  In consideration of low-light tactical environments, possibly caused by 
terrorists cutting power, the police source saw value in SWARM units, even in the 
absence of fire and smoke.    
D. LIMITS OF TRAINING 
The importance of training is a general theme throughout this inquiry, stressed by 
the interviews and in the literature, but there are limits to training.  Firefighting is a 
uniquely chaotic occupation, where countless variables enter into a firefighter’s decision-
making, from the unit-level to the highest command.     
During a Shield conference at NYPD headquarters in lower Manhattan in January, 
2011, attended by hundreds of fire safety and security personnel for corporate buildings, 
along with a predominately law-enforcement audience, Robert Lukach, a NYPD Deputy 
Inspector, spoke on Special Operations Division’s preparedness for active-shooter 
attacks.  Lukach said that ESU police officers are trained to Firefighter 1 national 
standards (Lukach, 2011), which presumably gives them the expertise that they need to 
operate in a fire or smoke environment while engaging terrorists during a Mumbai-style 
attack.  According to a course outline on Firefighter 1 training, it takes 78 hours to certify 
(NYS Office of Fire Prevention, 2004), compared to six-months of training that the 
average FDNY probationary firefighter receives in the academy; the firefighter is still not 
considered proficient in the profession for several years after his classroom instruction.  
As per current New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (NYCRR), Firefighting 1 and II 
training is meant to provide “minimum standards for firefighting personnel” (2011), and 
not professional expertise, which is a multi-year combination of training and experience 
in the urban fire service.  
Another key difference between firefighting and law enforcement is the frequency 
of responses to active, life-threatening incidents.  The majority of firefighters learn their 
craft in actual fires under close supervision of officers and senior members over a long 
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period of time, whereas police officers discharge their weapons infrequently.  A NYPD 
report on police shootings showed that in 2010, NYPD police officers were involved in 
34 “adversarial conflict police shootings” (NYPD, 2011a), involving a workforce of 
34,500 (NYPD, 2011b).  In 2010, the FDNY responded to the following structural fires: 
26,748 total; 2,464 “all-hands,” typically involving about 50 firefighters; and 242 multi-
alarms (FDNY, 2011a), with a uniformed workforce of 10,725 firefighters and officers 
(FDNY, 2011b).   
Training alone cannot provide someone with the necessary expertise to safely 
function at an advanced fire.  A study on the limitations of training for Iraqi forces was 
released in Parameters, a publication from the U.S. Army War College. “Training [sic] 
cannot solve all human performance problems,” the article said, “some disciplines view 
training as a last resort, to be employed only when no other means of improving 
performance will work” (Felicetti, 2007).  
E. WEAPONS FOR FIREFIGHTERS 
Due to the chaos that would surround a Mumbai-style terror attack, especially if 
incendiary fires reach an advanced stage, firefighters may have to carry firearms in case 
they are split from their police escorts, or if their security is incapacitated.  When asked 
his thoughts on the idea of arming firefighters who will operate in a low-sensory 
environment alongside police officers, the police source said that he “did not have a 
problem with it,” but would have to be done within the strictest procedurals controls and 
training protocols (anonymous personal communication, October 9, 2010).   
The concept of armed firefighters has a precedent.  Some firefighters working as 
tactical medics in Clayton County (Georgia) are certified to carry 40 caliber Glock semi-
automatic pistols, which includes sharpshooter tests and regular training with police with 
SWAT teams (Roberts, 2010, p. 64).  Firefighters also carry body armor, wear law 
enforcement uniforms and wear Kevlar helmets.  The pistols are secured in a locked gun 
vault and are opened only when a special operations’ call comes in (Roberts, 2010, p. 
64).  The decision to arm these firefighters is meant as a backup in case SWAT members 
are unable to protect them, and not as an offensive measure.   
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F. THE NEED TO ALIGN AGENCIES’ MISSIONS  
At most incidents, firefighters and police have separate, sometimes competing, 
goals.  If an incident only requires a law enforcement presence, or if it is strictly a fire, 
there will be little operational or mission overlap, but if an event blurs the line between 
the two agencies regarding life-safety or incident mitigation, tensions could arise.  No 
group members would willingly relinquish a task that they feel is within their primary 
mission, but more clarity and better communications can lessen any friction.   
In general, there needs to be more communication among response agencies to 
harness the expertise of all players.  During exercises, the police source said, “There is 
always an assumption of what other agencies will do without them being in the room, 
which I find amazing, because I don’t know what made us [PD] all of a sudden experts 
on what another agency will do.”  It would be better if someone from the other agency 
makes decisions within their area of expertise, but law enforcement sometimes operates 
in a vacuum, he said. 
Concerning the idea of the joint unit, all three interviewees (who were coded), as 
well as Mike McPartland, expressed concern over the joint unit command structure, and 
what exactly the roles of firefighters and police would be.  McPartland concluded the 
interview by asking a difficult question: “When you need PD protection to operate a 
hoseline, who is in charge?” (personal communication, January 17, 2011).   
G. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE COST OF INACTION 
The SWARM-unit concept must gain support from political leaders at all levels of 
government if it has chance to succeed.  One possible way to promote the SWARM unit 
in political circles is to ask what would be public reaction if the units are not formed, and 
many people are killed or injured.  In an unrelated example, the substandard response by 
the NYC Sanitation Department during a surprisingly intense snow storm that hit the day 
after Christmas last year, led to intense criticism of the sanitation department and the 
mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM).  The response from the mayor’s 
office was swift.  For the next snow storm a week later, plows and salt spreaders were a 
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ubiquitous site, though snow totals were much less; a fact that was not lost on New 
Yorkers or the media (Saul, 2011).  The lesson here that it is better to make changes 
before a knowable incident occurs.  “If you go back the last two years, we can’t say 
anymore that we never thought of ten guys with guns going around the city killing 
everybody,” the police source said, “if you do, you are going to sound ridiculous” 
(anonymous personal communication, October 9, 2010).  
The SWARM unit may be financially viable in consideration of legal liability that 
would be part of the Mumbai-style attack’s aftermath.  As mentioned above, many 
lawsuits associated with the police response to the Columbine massacre cite the slow 
emergency response into the building.  It would be naïve to say that the right preparations 
can prevent a Mumbai-attack from becoming a mass-casualty incident, but it may 
minimize the carnage.  “If we fail to act in the face of this swarm warning, the only 
uncertainties remaining will be about whether the damage done by such attacks is grave 
or catastrophic,” Arquilla offered in an editorial, “let's do something before it comes to 
this” (2010). 
H. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SWARM UNIT: TRAIN ALL MEMBERS  
No honest academic inquiry would be complete without a look at the alternative 
view.  The anonymous police source said, “I like the integration idea, but I would hesitate 
to say that I would be behind a dedicated team, partly because they would be underused.”  
He went on to say that it would be difficult to justify the costs and manpower 
commitment associated with integrated teams to department leaders, respectively.  To 
prove his point, he mentioned the NYPD critical response vehicle (CRV) program that 
was active after 9/11, designed to quickly flood an area with police resources, usually 
around 50 patrols cars.  Three years later, CRVs were less common as commanders had a 
hard time justifying the program’s effectiveness (anonymous personal communication, 
October 9, 2010).  
Concerning preparations for a Mumbai-style attack, the police source’s first 
priority would be to give the average patrol officer the awareness and capability that they 
need to directly challenge terrorists.  Instead of the current strategy to “isolate and 
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contain,” and then wait for specialized units, beat cops could act more offensively against 
terrorists, which would translate as earlier mitigation and control, improving hostages’ 
and civilians’ chance of survival.  Due to delivery limitations, the police source is less 
inclined to rely on dispersed, specialized units.  “It is almost unfair to put them [ESU] in 
a situation that they can’t respond to in the appropriate amount of time,” he said.   
The police source calls for better intra-agency integration within police 
departments: Can those average officers integrate with that two-man [ESU] team to make 
entry?”  He questions specialization as the answer to emerging terror tactics that are fast 
and dynamic.  “Why do we dumb down the average guy and train up the guy that is not 
going to be there?” he asked (anonymous personal communication, October 9, 2010).   
Building on the police source’s idea of department-wide training for all members, 
another possible strategy for the FDNY would be to train field units about the hazards 
associated with paramilitary terror attacks.  Just as the police source envisions the 
average patrol officer having the skills to work alongside an ESU police officer, with the 
right training, any combination of firefighters and police personnel could quickly 
assemble and perform at a Mumbai-style attack, specifically, insertion with a hoseline 
with security protection (similar to what occurred at Freddy’s), with the explicit purpose 
of saving as many lives as possible.  System-wide emergency responder swarming 
capabilities aligns with recent recommendations by military theorist John Arquilla.  “I 
recommend the notion of building a swarming capacity of our own,” Arquilla said, 
“police, military and other responders should be prepared to seize control from the 
terrorists at or near the outset of any incident, wherever it might take place” (2010).  
It seems counterintuitive, but standardized training for personnel in corporations 
or government departments can promote flexibility, which can allow leadership to 
quickly respond to a crisis.  Retired U.S. Air Force Colonel Randall J. Larsen stresses 
that “standardization is the key to flexibility—that, and prior training” (Larsen, 2007, p. 
205).  Larsen cites air force policy to have all pilots trained to the exact same standards, 
including procedures, vernacular, and pre-flight checklists, but an example from the 
private sector made the most impact.  
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Randall Larsen described how United Parcel Service (UPS) handled a snow and 
ice storm in 1990 that threatened its national route hub in Louisville, Kentucky (Larsen, 
2007, p. 205).  Local employees could not make it to work after the mayor essentially 
shut down the city, but the airport had the necessary winter equipment to remain open, so 
UPS employees were flown into Louisville airport from across the country to take over 
UPS operations.  With standardized procedures, UPS employees who had never worked 
in Louisville were able to do what was asked of them, ensuring on-time delivery of 
critical packages nationwide.  UPS’s successful response to Louisville’s freak winter 
storm was enabled due to system-wide standards, which all emergency responders can 




V. ORIGINS AND DYNAMICS OF GROUP BIAS   
A. INTRODUCTION  
As discussed in Chapter IV, one solution to complex, assault-style terrorist attacks 
would be joint fire-police units, named SWARM units.  The success of the unit would 
depend on many factors, including political considerations, budget, compatibility in 
communications, operational cohesion, logistical issues and lastly, addressing ingrained 
group bias.  The primary function of this inquiry is to explore the last category, namely, 
the origins and dynamics of group bias, and how this universal social phenomenon affects 
group interactions and integration.  If the proper approach can attenuate bias among 
firefighters and police officers who agree to join vanguard units, one hurdle can be 
overcome as the units reach operational readiness.  An inquiry into group bias would not 
just benefit a joint fire-police unit, but any organization that is exploring an inter-agency 
approach to a unique, complex issue.  According to cognitive psychologists, “One of the 
most destructive and perplexing problems facing contemporary society is the pervasive 
tendency of people to respond with hostility and disdain toward those who are different 
from themselves” (Greenberg Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kiskland, 
Lyon, 1990, p. 308).  As stated in a 2007 article in Psychology of Terrorism, “changes in 
mind-set are required to accommodate the implications of more complex operating 
environments” (Paton & Violanti, 2007, p. 235). 
To promote cohesiveness of proposed SWARM units, the evolutionary origins 
and mechanisms of bias will be explored, along with current theories on personal and 
group identity, including social identity theory (SIT), self- and re-categorization, dual 
identity (cross-categorization), Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM), minimal group 
paradigm, and leadership.  If current identity theories are applied correctly, bias can be 
reversed or greatly minimized.  A clear strategy on addressing group bias is essential to 
the success of a joint, vanguard unit, or any multi-agency collaboration.     
A study titled The Difficulties of Improvising in a Crisis Situation asked: “What 
happens when several groups of actors are involved, and when these groups have 
  52
divergent methods and referentials or different professional identities?” (Roux-Dufort & 
Vidaillet, 2003, p. 88).  “Agencies implicitly think of themselves as being the most 
important, and, as a group, their natural tendency is to resist deferring to another 
organization,” FDNY Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer said in article presented in 
Psychology of Terrorism, “this is especially true for police and fire departments whose 
organizational development reinforces a sense of belonging to an important group” 
(2007, p. 212). Pfeifer added that “during large, complex incidents, agencies must change 
this perception by viewing themselves as part of a unified command” (2007, p. 212).   
Taking the idea one step further, assault-style terrorist attacks will require more 
than several agencies working separately, though collaboratively, but with more 
thoughtful integration.  Paramilitary-style terrorism will require the first wave of police 
and firefighters to be part of not just a unified command, but unified units.  SWARM 
units could meet the challenges of multidimensional terrorist attack, or any active-shooter 
incident, by having the best of both agencies working seamlessly as a cohesive group.  In 
this instance, unification must shift not just at command posts, but at the operational 
level.   
In the same article on organizational bias, Pfeifer cited an earlier article on the 
World Trader Center response: “(Social identity) creates a positive in-group bias toward 
those who are part of the same group and negative out-group bias against those who are 
part of an alternate group (Deaux, 1996; Zimbardo, 2004)” (Pfeifer, 2007, p. 208).  
Current psychological theories makes the statement irrefutable, but that same dynamic 
can be used to build cohesion in a joint unit, even though local firefighters and police 
officers come from organizations that do not have a strong history of collaboration or 
trust.  Group bias will never be eradicated, but it can be transferred.  As the research 
shows, participants that train and work together, sharing a common identity, will form 
that critical primary bond, but simply working closely together on a regular basis is just 
one of the triggers to promote cohesion.   
For SWARM units to work, the policemen and firemen who volunteer will have 
to support the joint-unit concept on both an emotional and intellectual level; trust must be 
built, and barriers must fall.  According to a 2002 article in the Annual Review of 
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Psychology, “salient intergroup boundaries are associated with mutual distrust (Brown & 
Gardham 2001), and this undermines the potential for cooperative independence and 
mutual liking” (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002, p. 591).  According to Henri Tajfel’s 
groundbreaking studies, social identity is defined as “that part of the individuals’ self-
concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership” (Tajfel, 
1982, p. 25).  Group bias is hardly a new phenomenon.  
B. ORIGINS OF GROUP BIAS: HUNTER-GATHERER SOCIETIES  
Group bias can be seen as an evolutionary necessity in pre-civilized human 
formations.  “Collaboration in social groups is a skill that very probably evolved early in 
the evolution of our ancestors as primitive social relation,” according to Fathali 
Moghaddam, a psychologist at Georgetown University and the Naval Postgraduate 
School, “and well before we developed complex forms of collaboration characteristics of 
contemporary human societies” (2002, p. 40).  Moghaddam postulates that group 
members who had support of other group members had a better chance at survival (p. 
102), giving the group an evolutionary advantage: “identity did not just serve individual 
survival functions, it also affected group survival” (p. 103).   
Samuel Bowles, an economist at Santa Fe Institute, joins a list of scientists 
postulating that a person’s instinctive tendency towards group bias is a vestige of 
humanity’s hunter-gatherer past.  He asks, “Could war among ancestral humans have had 
substantial effects on the evolution of altruistic behavior?” (Bowles, 2009, p. 2).  
Bowles’s definition of altruism appears to be narrower than the conventional meaning; he 
implies that acts of selflessness are limited to what is advantageous to the in-group and 
not society or mankind as a whole.  “This might help explain why altruism often does not 
extend across group boundaries and how this kind of ‘parochial altruism’ may have 
evolved in humans…” according to Bowles (2009, p. 14).  This type of “parochial 




not too passive.  Those groups that were too individualistic were eventually defeated or 
assimilated by the selective altruists, and the less-warlike, generally-altruistic tribes 
suffered the same fate.   
In Bowles’s (2009) paper, he defends the idea that social behaviors of warring 
groups during this era had an effect on human evolution.  According to Bowles, “the 
underlying mechanism is that (as Darwin put it) groups with ‘a greater number of 
courageous, sympathetic and faithful members,’ who were always ready to warn each 
other of danger, to aid and defend each other…would spread and be victorious over other 
tribes” (Bowles, 2009, p. 2).  In other words, members of a tribe who were cooperative 
within their group, but hostile to out-groups, had an evolutionary advantage over the 
course of generations.  Over countless generational iteration, the selective altruists 
dominated human advancement.  Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, who wrote the 
often cited, “The Selfish Gene” in the 1970s, defended the idea of individual, or “gene” 
selection, but acknowledged a counter view, called group selection, where “a group, such 
as a species or a population within a species, whose individual members are prepared to 
sacrifice for the welfare of the group, may be less likely to go extinct than a rival group 
whose individual members placed their own selfish interests first” (1989, p. 7).    
Theories on hunter-gatherer-era origins of group bias can help explain why 
interagency conflict is so fierce today among NYC emergency responders.  Just like 
today’s group conflicts among emergency personnel, it can be assumed that competing 
tribes during the hunter-gatherer era shared similar genetics based on the fact that their 
travels on foot were limited to about 200–300 square miles (Moghaddam, 2008, pp. 94–
99), which usually did not bring them far enough to encounter drastically different races.  
Today, municipal policemen and firemen share a common genetic and cultural inventory, 
based on the same demography, neighborhoods, schools, and churches—in some cases, 
even the same families.  Many firefighter and police officer families intermarry, 
perpetuating the cycle to subsequent generations.  “People come to see themselves as 
members of groups that are in fundamental respects different from other groups, but 
actually in many cases the intergroup differences are minor,” Moghaddam said (2008, p.  
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51).  Despite apparent homogeneity, rivalry seems more natural than cooperation within 
emergency-responder ranks.  Bias is a multigenerational constant, though it can be 
regulated.   
Within inter-group conflict among tribal societies, according to anthropological 
field studies, conflict and hostility can be minimized through “crossing” the members of 
each group (Tajfel, 1982). Most notably through intergroup marriage; it appears that 
firefighters and police buck this theory, which can be explained by their respective 
identities along vocational and not family lines, within this context. What is encouraging 
is that “criss-cross” categorization, among other identity reclassifications, is an effective 
way to attenuate discrimination by breaking down perceived homogeneity of both in- and 
out-groups.  A look at current theories on identity categorization, among others, can help 
emergency responders understand, and overcome, group bias, when it becomes necessary 
to create units with a mixed membership.    
C. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY (SIT) 
Much of group bias is based on a person’s accepted identity, and the foundational 
approach in social psychology to this phenomenon is called social identity theory (SIT), 
pioneered by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in the late 1970s.  In general, this fluid, 
organic theory proposes that people seek a positive, distinct membership from the groups 
they associate with, sometimes at the expense of other groups.   
In the following sections are the SIT’s five main “tenets,” or postulates. 
1. Identity Motivation 
In the first tenet, called “motivation,” people strive for a “positive and distinct 
identity” (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 94).  Everyone is drawn to groups that allow them to 
positively express their beliefs and interests.  If someone’s group is viewed positively by 
the general population, members will have higher self esteem based on that affiliation 
(Crisp, 2006).  The same is true for emergency-response organizations, which offer 
distinct histories, commendable missions, and fiercely-protected reputations that satisfy 
participants’ need for something unique and rewarding. 
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Within the parameters of the first postulate, SIT recognizes that the yearning for 
distinctiveness can satisfied by an almost infinite number of cultural or vocational 
identities, which is a promising concept in the formation of new, combined units.  
Though they share many similarities, the FDNY and NYPD portray very different 
reputations and subcultures, and these differences attract an array of applicants with 
diverse abilities, personalities, and backgrounds.  If packaged the right way, SWARM 
units will be attractive to both high-performing firefighters and police officers.   
2. Centrality of Social Identity 
The second theme of SIT is “centrality of social identity” (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 
95), meaning that prospective members will be attracted to what the group represents.  
Most firefighters and police officers join their professions for something more than job 
security, adventure, and pensions.  Prospective firefighters and police officers are drawn 
to these organizations with long, storied histories of heroic deeds and sacrifice.  Many 
applicants are attracted to these deep traditions, and they want to be part of a continuing 
legacy.  For example, after the 9/11 attacks, recruitment and interest in the FDNY soared 
as many young men and women strived to be part of an agency whose sacrifices inspired 
a nation.  Superlative nicknames such as “Bravest” and “Finest” suggest a high level of 
zeal and competence, providing easily identifiable symbols to the public.  In Tajfel’s 
1978 paper on SIT, social identity is defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept 
which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) 
together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” 
(Moghaddam, 2008, p. 95).  After solidifying their identity within their primary agency 
over the course of a career, it will be a challenge to shift, however slightly, participants’ 
identities towards the new, dual-agency SWARM units.  The emotional link that 
participants have to their primary agency must not be replaced or severed but 
complemented with the new unit (to be explored later).    
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3. Identity Through Social Comparisons   
The third tenet, “social comparison,” recognizes that for someone to feel that they 
are in an exclusive or special group, it must be compared favorably to some like group.  
According to Moghaddam, “the nature of the social comparisons we make are influenced 
by both our perceptions of our group memberships…and the particular group goals we 
adopt” (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 96).  With group identity, the status of the group is judged 
by how well or how poorly a person’s in-group compares to another group.  “Intergroup 
bias frequently takes the form of in-group enhancement rather than outgroup 
devaluation,” according to Gaertner et al. (1990).  Units or groups that strive to be the 
best compared to similar entities can be used as an advantage in the formation of 
combined units.  SWARM units, designed to address complex active-shooter events, 
would be the first of their kind, but positive comparisons can be made to current counter-
terrorism or counter-assault teams in the military or law enforcement units.  With its 
ability to address and mitigate fire, a municipal joint-unit that is trained and prepared to 
operate in a complex, active-shooter environment (firearms, explosions, fire, smoke, etc.) 
would have an advantage over current military strike teams.    
4. Availability of Cognitive Alternatives 
The fourth tenet stresses the importance of “cognitive alternatives” in social 
identity within a group, which acknowledges that groups are rarely homogenous entities.  
Tensions between those who are satisfied or unsatisfied within a group are seen as a 
normal part of group dynamics.  SIT is most relevant for those dissatisfied with some 
aspect of their group.  According to the original authors of SIT, the strategy that 
dissatisfied group members will take to affect change will depend on whether the present 
situation is seen as either “stable” or “legitimate” (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 96).  Also, the 
influence of authority figures is considered “highly important” on how a group 
collectively perceives what is acceptable, suggesting how important leadership, both 
formal and informal, is to group dynamics.  Within different units and commands, 
firefighters, and police all have ideas of what is considered “legitimate” regarding levels 
of competencies, relations with other units and agencies, acceptable risk in different 
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contexts, and whether the group is performing to expectations.  Dissatisfied members of 
the group will strive to improve the group’s competencies.    
5. Identity Improvement Strategies    
The final tenet of SIT, “improvement,” flows naturally from the fourth step.  A 
minority subgroup that is dissatisfied with the status quo can attempt to improve the 
group through two processes: “normative” (individual improvements) measures that do 
not disrupt the balance of power; and “nonnormative” maneuvers that directly challenge 
the leadership of the group (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 98).  Established members of a group 
will most likely affect change through normative efforts that do not disrupt the power 
balance, thus preserving their status.  If a more concerted attempt to improve the group 
by dissatisfied members with less status is carried out, it will be seen as a “direct 
challenge,” where a minority group takes on the majority in an attempt to alter intergroup 
relations (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 98).  The normative approach would prove most 
effective, considering the strictly hierarchal, paramilitary model common in emergency 
response organizations.   
Within the SIT framework, for a SWARM unit proposal to succeed, the idea 
would require “buy-in” from leaders from both sides, and the most effective changes 
would be made through legitimate means.  When combined, these final two tenets reveal 
how those who seek improvement, both self and organizational, can be a driving force in 
any group, even large-scale fire and police departments.  
D. USING COOPERATION TO MITIGATE BIAS 
Social identity theory has become the springboard for an array of social 
psychology theories that took aim at the group-bias phenomenon.  In 1990, a paper 
presented in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology explained how 
cooperation between groups can lower intergroup bias, even from groups with a history 
of competiveness or hostility.  Under the social categorization framework, cooperation 
can dissolve perceived boundaries among two merged groups, who had not previously 
identified with each other.  “Cooperation degraded the two-group representation and 
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induced the memberships to recategorize themselves primarily as one larger group,” 
according to the 1990 article on cooperation and group bias (Gaertner et al.).   
Intergroup cooperation is seen as a “complex process” dependent on several 
factors, including interaction, common goals, and a common destiny.  Another important 
consideration is the nature of the respective group’s previous relationship, suggesting that 
groups that are historical rivals will require a more delicate approach than groups that 
were not fiercely competitive.  Inter-group contact becomes even more complicated as 
certain initiatives designed to dissolve boundaries and promote cooperation may have the 
opposite effect, which can trigger in-group bias among communities that overlap.  And a 
reward structure alone is not a strong enough motivator to ensure intergroup cooperation, 
requiring a more internalized mechanism to encourage participant acceptance.   
E. SELF-CATEGORIZATION AND RECATEGORIZATION  
As advances based on SIT became more refined, the concept of categorization, 
and later self-categorization and recategorization, gained discipline-wide acceptance.  “At 
the foundation of intergroup relations is the basic process of categorizing the world and 
identifying individuals as belonging to different groups,” stated Moghaddam (2008, p. 
29).  Tajfel’s research revealed that categorization results in two cognitive consequences: 
exaggerated differences between groups and minimized differences within a group 
(Moghaddam, 2008, p. 31).    
Self-categorization theory is described as “an infinitely malleable, dynamic 
cognitive strategy through which the self can be categorized in contrast to many different 
entities—such as other individuals within the group—or as part of an ingroup that stands 
in contrast to outgroups…” (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 101).  The theory states that 
perceptions, whether accurate or not, directly influence intergroup bias (Crisp, Stone, & 
Hall, 2006, p. 230).  Ingroup identification shows that the relationships between 
identification, self-stereotyping, attitudes, and performance are not static but dynamic and 
fluctuating (Crisp & Abrams, 2008, p. 272).  The malleable nature of identity in self-
categorization theory is most important to organizations attempting to create a new entity.   
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Gaertner et al. claimed, “Intergroup cooperation promotes intergroup acceptance 
because it reduces the cognitive salience of the intergroup boundary” (1990, p. 693).  In 
plain language, when people who represent different groups are thrust into same space 
and expected to cooperate, stereotypes and reflexive bias are minimized, paving the way 
for more authentic interaction.  To drop barriers, members of the respective groups must 
meet regularly in training exercises.  In his 2002 book, The Tipping Point, author 
Malcom Gladwell cites a study in a Manhattan housing project where people where asked 
who their closest friends were, 88 percent of respondents listed their closest friend as 
another resident of the same building.  “Proximity overpowered similarity,” according to 
Gladwell (2002, p. 35).   
An extension on self-categorization theory is the meta-contrast principle, which 
states: “two groups will be perceived as such when the differences between the groups 
outweigh the differences within them, is central” (Crisp et al., 2006, p. 231).  In other 
words, people tend to emphasize the differences between their group and an outside 
group, rather than accentuating the differences among members within their group.  
According to self-categorization, similarities among groups will weaken cognitive 
boundaries, allowing two groups to be perceived as a single subordinate entity, though 
there are dangers in too much similarity.   
If members of the joint group can be convinced that their counterparts share 
common traits and goals, eventually they will be seen as one.  “Cooperative tasks,” 
according to research, will encourage a common identity (Crisp et al., 2006, p. 231).  One 
study proved that integrated seating patterns among a racially diverse sample group 
lowered bias and shifted perceptions to an “inclusive single group” (Crisp et al., 2006, p. 
231).  Intense, realistic active-shooter scenarios where firefighters and police officers in 
SWARM units train side-by-side would qualify as a cooperative task that would 
encourage a common identity, which must be established before an incident.  
Commenting on the importance of pre-incident interaction, Joe Downey said, “Unless 
they [participating firefighters and police officers] do it prior to the event, with teams 
working together, it is going to be difficult to work together that day” (personal 
communication, September 7, 2010).  A French case study on improvisation in a crisis, 
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which cited at least three international fire incidents, claimed “the absence of procedural 
memory among the groups hinders improvisation,” and that “the groups involved in this 
case had not developed routines or procedures that would have enabled them to work 
together” (Roux-Dufort & Vidaillet, 2003, p. 102).  During a Mumbai-style attack, the 
tactical situation will be very fluid and an effective response team will have to make 
instantaneous decisions, which should be made as an extension of, and not in lieu of, 
training.      
As the SWARM units form and participants are encouraged to dissolve 
previously-held social barriers against members of a perceived outgroup, who are now 
part of a new ingroup, re-categorization efforts could have the opposite effect and 
actually increase bias.  “People who perceive their group as critical for self-definition, 
blurring boundaries can be problematic,” according to research published in a 2009 
article in Basic and Applied Social Psychology (Hall, Crisp & Suen, p. 245).  Organizers 
of the SWARM units would have find ways to drop boundaries without activating a 
defensive bias reaction.    
In recategorization, the individual shifts their affiliation from one group to 
another, under the right conditions.  Early research on self-categorization theory showed 
that “modifying members’ representations even slightly may encourage the initiation of 
more constructive and cooperative intergroup relations” (Gaertner et al., 1990, p. 703).  
The theory implies that identity is not always rigid and static, but dynamic, opening up 
the possibility that allegiances can shift; however, there are some caveats related to 
recategorization.   
Some research suggests that recategorization may actually increase group bias 
among people that strongly identify with the original group.  “It is argued that such 
unwanted consequences of recategorization will only be apparent for perceivers who are 
highly committed to their ingroup subgroups,” according to Crisp et al. (2006), “it was 
found that maintaining the salience of subgroups within a recategorized subordinate 
group averted this increase in bias for high identifiers and led overall to the lowest levels 
of bias.”   
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Not all identities are equal. People who loosely associate with a group (“low 
identifiers”) will not be as defensive if they perceive a threat to their affiliation to the 
group, but the “high identifiers,” who are most likely to exhibit ingroup favoritism, react 
more strongly to challenges to their ingroup.  The high-identifier bias tendency has been 
proven in studies on organizational mergers (Crisp et al., 2006, p. 232).  According to 
research, low distinctiveness between the original group and subordinate group 
contributed to ingroup bias, but not for those with looser affiliations.  “For high 
identifiers, low distinctiveness led to increased bias relative to high distinctiveness, but 
this was not the case for low identifiers,” as stated in a 2006 article in Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin (Crisp et al, p. 232).  Recategorization is still valid with high 
identifiers, but as the two groups integrate, mechanisms must be in place to maintain 
distinctiveness.  What can be emphasized to SWARM unit members is that the 
integration is intended to be a mini-merger, as participants remain full members of their 
respective fire and police departments, which reduces the risk that similarities between 
the original group and the newly formed-unit will trigger bias.  Also, organizers can 
stress that the combined expertise of both firefighters and police officers will make the 
unit functional, implying that a certain amount of distinctiveness is not just desired, but 
necessary.   
F. DUAL IDENTITY AND CROSS CATEGORIZATION  
Though it is an essential concept in understanding and minimizing bias, it would 
appear that recategorization, by itself, would not offer an effective identity strategy for 
firefighters and police officers.  Theories that allow for multiple, shifting social 
categorizations may prove more effective in real-world scenarios. 
The cross-categorization approach allows for categorical cross-cutting, where a 
person can simultaneously hold overlapping memberships across “multiple dimensions” 
(Hewstone et al., 2002, p. 592).  Overlapping memberships reduce bias because social 
categorization becomes more complex, which also decreases the importance of any one 
group’s distinction.  Cross categorization also makes members aware that outgroups are 
not homogenous but consist of subgroups.  Cross categorization, research proves, 
  63
increases “intracategory” differences as “intercategory” differentiation is reduced 
(Hewstone et al., 2002, p. 593).  Participants will acknowledge differences among 
members of their ingroup, and see fewer differences with outgroups, as boundaries 
dissolve.  Cross categorization is less effective in reducing bias in simple categorizations, 
but it shows merit when bias is directed against “double-out-group targets” (Hewstone et 
al., 2002, p. 592).   
The key to participant compliance may be simultaneous maintenance of both 
original and new identities (respective vocation and SWARM unit)—a theory known as 
the “dual identity” approach.  Because of the great pride that they take in their 
professions, most emergency responders can be considered prototype “high identifiers,” 
who are most resistant to new affiliations. Even so, identity transfer does not have to be 
zero-sum related to group affiliations; people hold many identities simultaneously.  For 
example, the average firefighter can associate with an almost endless number of formal or 
informal groups, including profession, rank, specialty, parenthood, nationality, 
neighborhood, appearance, age, ethnicity, professional sports’ affiliations, food 
preferences, alma mater, or political party. 
The most successful joint vanguard units would encourage participants to see the 
new unit as a complement to their many other professional identities and not as a 
replacement.  “If simultaneous categorization is optimal for observing reductions in 
intergroup bias, then it may hold the key to avoiding the propensity for heightened 
ingroup favoritism associated with high subgroup identification,” according to Crisp et al. 
(2006, p. 236).  As opposed to recategorization, “simultaneous categorization” ensures 
the salience of their original identities within the new, common group, which avoids 
threats to identity and distinctiveness.     
Firefighters and police officers participating in SWARM units will not wish to 
abandon their closely-held vocational identities, nor would they need to.  Crisp et al. 
(2006, p. 237) said that “maintaining the salience of original identities within this new 
subordinate common ingroup…could avoid any threatening consequences to subgroup 
members.”  Researchers have found that the dual-identity approach was more effective 
than just recategorization at reducing intergroup bias (Crisp et al., 2006, p. 237).  Because 
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“distinctiveness” (as per the first tenet of SIT) is preserved, meaning their original 
identity is secure, participants will more readily bond with the new, subordinate group—
in this case, the SWARM units.    
An effort to promote the advantages of dual identity, or simultaneous 
categorization, will have to be complemented by mechanisms that make the new, 
subordinate group appear favorable; dual identity should not be forced. The identity 
transition should genuinely trigger a positive reaction where joint-group members truly 
identity with the SWARM unit, and use sincere first-person narration when describing 
the group (i.e., “we”), which is consistent with another theory on identity and bias called 
the common ingroup identity model (CIIM).  CIIM states that intergroup relations 
improve when associations shift to “we.”  The recategorization occurs when former 
outgroup members are seen as more attractiveness, and a new, subordinate group is 
achieved.  It would be unrealistic to assume that dual identity is the panacea for group 
bias, but “simultaneous categorization intervention can mitigate against this (group bias) 
reactivity” (Crisp et al., 2006, p. 241). 
G. CIIM, FROM US AND THEM, TO WE 
Common ingroup identity model (CIIM) states that intergroup relations improve 
when associations shift from “us” and “them” to “we” (Crisp et al., 2006, p. 230).  
“Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM),” according to social theorists, “rests on the 
notion that by changing the nature of categorical representation from ‘us’ to ‘them’ to a 
more inclusive ‘we,’ it is possible to reduce intergroup bias” (Crisp et al., 2006, p. 230).  
Other psychologists propose that “to reduce bias, existing boundaries between groups 
should be eliminated so that both groups are included as one superordinate group” (Crisp, 
Turner, & Rhiannon, 2010, p. 32).   
With CIIM, contact blurs intergroup boundaries and subsequent recategorization 
into a shared identity (Crisp & Abrams, 2008, p. 257).  Blurring group lines is exactly 
what SWARM units would need.  Hall, Crisp & Suen said, “The dissolution of category 
boundaries has become a crucial factor in creating more harmonious intergroup relations” 
(2009, p. 245).  Eventually, participants would have to identify with the new group, but 
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some previous categorizations that reinforce distinctiveness would have to stay intact.  It 
is possible to benefit from CIIM, while simultaneously preserving highly-valued 
subgroup identities as intergroup boundaries are blurred (Crisp & Abrams, 2008, p. 272). 
By itself, recategorization from “them” to “we” may not be adequate to promote 
intergroup harmony.  “One of the main debates surrounding the common ingroup identity 
approach,” according to a recent paper, “is that it may be effective only at reducing 
intergroup bias in contexts in which group members are not strongly committed to the 
ingroup” (Crisp et al., 2010, p. 44).  Those not strongly committed, known as low 
identifiers, would normally not fill the ranks of emergency responders.  Most research 
suggests high identifiers require different triggers to dissolve group bias, compared to 
low identifiers, but recent paper claims otherwise.  “Here we showed that crossed 
categorization reduces intergroup bias irrespective of participants’ level of identification 
with the ingroup” (Crisp et al., 2010, p. 44). 
It would benefit SWARM units if procedures and training encouraged 
cooperation, instead of having leaders order participants to work together; the bias shift 
should occur naturally.  According to an article in Group Process & Intergroup 
Relations, “…studies have raised the possibility that it may not always be the best 
strategy to promote intergroup harmony, as it sometimes leads to increases in intergroup 
bias” (Crisp et al., 2010, p. 251).  Ordering strong-willed firefighters and police officers 
to change their perceptions would certainly trigger the opposite response.  “Bringing 
groups together, particularly when they are similar on an important dimension, might 
therefore arouse motivations to achieve positive distinctiveness, which could exacerbate 
rather than alleviate intergroup conflict,” according to Crisp et al. (2010, p. 251). 
What is needed to neutralize negative reactions, possibly due to a threat to 
distinctiveness, is a set of common goals that highlight group members’ 
interdependencies.  Early training could show police officers the importance of 
firefighting techniques as it relates fire extinguishment and searches in zero-visibility 
smoke environments, and how those skills are relevant in evacuating victims or hostages 
at a complex terror attack.  Conversely, training scenarios that highlight the importance 
of force protection, weaponry and close security can benefit participating firefighters not 
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just operationally but cognitively.  Research led by Muzafer Sherif in the 1960s proved 
that common goals helped form a common identity, improving intergroup relations (Crisp 
& Abrams, 2008, p. 247).  With the help of real-life training triggers and other 
mechanisms, favoritism of the original subgroup (fire or police) will subside as the 
SWARM unit gains acceptance. 
The emphasis on the new, subordinate group, along with common goals and 
interdependencies, can be reinforced in the training curriculum.  In the 20 years since it 
was created, Joe Downey explained that New York Task Force 1 (NY-TF1) has deployed 
about a dozen times.  Part of what has made the taskforce successful is combined training 
and periodic equipment maintenance.  “They [participating firefighters and police 
officers] are told, you work together for a common cause,” Joe Downey said, “we are 
training together and it seems to work” (personal communication, September 7, 2010).  
According to CIIM, common goals help to reduce anxiety and promote group harmony.  
Implicit in the formation of the SWARM units is the belief that its goals overlap with the 
missions of both agencies.         
Considering his experience with Task Force 1, Chief Downey was asked how the 
joint, active-shooter unit could benefit from joint training and other pre-incident 
initiatives.  “If you direct it as a taskforce, like we do on the outside with New York 
Taskforce 1, the guys pre-drill together, they are mobilized together, [and] they are taking 
care of equipment together,” Joe Downey said.  “They are [also] working together; if you 
have that incident where you are going to encounter firearms, explosions and fire, for 
example, at least they [firefighters and police officers] know each other” (personal 
communication, September 7, 2010).   
The distinction between cross-categorization (dual identity) and CIIM is subtle, 
but important in how the members see themselves.  In CIIM, identity is simplified as two 
groups are brought together within the context of a shared identity (Crisp et al., 2010, p. 
33).  With the dual-identity model, self identity becomes more complex, as participants 
must recognize the four subgroups that are created when two groups combine (in this 
case: firefighter, firefighter/SWARM unit member, police officer, police 
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officer/SWARM unit member).  The cognitive complexity may promote more realistic 
and favorable constructions of the “target,” or fellow participants from an outside agency.   
H. MINIMAL GROUP PARADIGM  
Other psychological theories reinforce the idea that identity can be ascribed to an 
almost infinite number of associations and combinations.  The minimal group paradigm, 
another SIT-based theory, confirms the idea that people keep multiple identities 
simultaneously, which reinforces the notion that group bias can be built on subtle or 
abstract differences. According to Moghaddam, “the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et 
al., 1971) provides strong evidence that just about any criterion for social categorization 
can be used by group members to construct a positive and distinct identity for 
themselves” (2008, p. 94).  An emergency responder who identifies with his joint-unit, 
along with his primary agency or command, is well within the framework of minimal 
group paradigm.   
With SWARM units, recategorization will not require participants to abandon 
their greater vocation, but will require them add a sub-identity with a group of people that 
they have traditionally seen as outsiders.  As stated earlier, the trick is to maintain the 
“saliency,” or prominence, of the primary group, as the participant eases into the new, 
mixed group, thus, securing some aspect of distinctiveness in the vanguard unit.  Some 
type of physical indicator to satisfy the primary-group saliency requirement, possibly a 
patch or other item on the uniform (if they wear the same ensemble), may provide 
participants with the cues they need to internally balance both their primary and new 
group.  “There are few limits in the criteria that could be used by people to categorize and 
to differentiate between human groups,” Moghaddam said (2008, p. 36).  For instance, at 
the functional level, a crucifix is just two pieces of wood (or other material) joined 
together, but it provides a power symbol for Christian identity and differentiation 
(Moghaddam, 2008, p. 36).  Firefighters and police officers may not be as reverential to 




the tools or physical objects that help to define their vocations (guns, batons, hoses, 
helmets, Halligan forcible-entry tools, etc.).  The challenge to unit organizers is finding 
out how to harness symbolism effectively.      
In time, as trust builds among members of SWARM units, and a better 
understanding of firefighters’ and police officers’ respective levels of expertise, previous 
boundaries may fall.  “When group affiliation is meaningful to member’s self-identities, 
intergroup cooperation that allows each group to make favorable and distinctive 
intergroup comparisons may permit the memberships to develop mutual respect for one 
another without threatening their own positive group identities” (Gaertner et al., 1990).  
Another study found that by having intergroup participants list shared characteristics, 
ingroup/outgroup differentiation was reduced (Crisp & Abrams, 2008, p. 261).  
Firefighters and police officers are similar in their commitment to public service, pride in 
their jobs, especially under dangerous conditions, and a sense of community.  As 
participants realize that their counterparts in sister emergency-response agencies share 
many of the same values through different, but complementary, missions and operations, 
social bonds can form without threatening distinctiveness.   
Another way to drop barriers between firefighter and police personnel is to 
emphasis a shared identity outside of the realm of emergency response. Many firefighters 
and police officers are military veterans, which is an extremely powerful common 
identity.  For example, besides moving up the ranks to reach their respective agencies’ 
highest office, New York City Fire Commissioner Salvatore J. Cassano and Police 
Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly are both combat veterans of the Vietnam War (New 
York City Fire Department, Salvatore J. Cassano, 2011; New York Police Department, 
Administration/Police Commissioner, 2011).  At the unit level, if the FDNY recruits 
firefighters for the SWARM units from its pool of military veterans with tactical training 
and combat experience, who are familiar with firearms and close quarters combat, it 
would benefit the group at the operational, social, and cognitive levels.  Firefighters with 
previous tactical training may be accepted by police officers quicker through the common 
identity.      
  69
Ideally, participants of the SWARM units will start to see each other as people, 
and not caricatures, as they shift to “personalized rather than categorized interactions” 
(Gaertner et al., 1990).  New opinions of fellow participants along with increased 
cooperation, facilitated through joint training, will cause members of a new group to 
eventually see themselves as a one (subordinate) unified group.   
I. REDUCING ANXIETY TO LOWER THE STEREOTYPE THREAT 
Participants must perceive their counterparts in the SWARM unit as honestly and 
realistically as possible, and not resort to simplified, usually inaccurate, conclusions 
about another person’s worth.  According to one paper from the European Review of 
Social Psychology: “Stereotype threat is ‘a situational predicament—felt in situations 
where one can be judged by, treated in terms of, or self-fulfil[led] negative stereotypes 
about one’s group’’’ (Crisp & Abrams, 2008, p. 243).  The researchers cite previous 
studies that link a tendency towards stereotyping to anxiety.  Negative inter-group 
interactions can be seen as a reaction to perceived threats, discrimination, or rejection.  
Other research confirms that “implicit prejudice is malleable and can be reduced using 
varied methodologies,” according to a paper in Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 
“these include learning to negate explicitly presented stereotypical information” (Hall, 
Crisp, & Suen, 2009, p. 245). 
When participants are made to feel psychologically secure, stereotypes and 
anxiety dissolve, and categorization (as per CIIM) shifts from “us” and “them,” to “we” 
(Crisp & Abrams, 2008, p. 247).  There are several proven ways to lower anxiety, and 
subsequently stereotyping, when groups combine or interact.  “Intergroup anxiety is 
likely to arise where there has been minimal previous contact and when there are large 
differences in status (Stephan & Stephan, 1985),” according to Crisp et al. (2008, p. 247).  
These two issues, ‘previous contact” and status are easily addressed.  A joint unit that 
trains regularly will satisfy the contact requirement.  With training, members of the 




solidifies socially.  For example, a study of Muslim-Hindu relations proved that “high-
quality” contact among participants made for more positive out-group perceptions (Crisp 
& Abrams, 2008, p. 249).   
Regarding status, participants in the joint unit will be comprised of firefighters 
and police officers of comparable ranks, respectively.  It is likely that the NYPD will man 
the unit with personnel from Emergency Service Units (ESU), who are technically 
detectives, but operationally, they perform as specialized police officers (SWAT units, 
etc.) and not as investigators.  Immediate leadership will come from FDNY company 
officers (lieutenants or captains), or NYPD patrol supervisors, who are either sergeants or 
lieutenants; despite different titles, the ranks are comparable in span of leadership and 
salary.   
With NY-TF-1, fire and police supervisors share dual-leadership roles, suggesting 
the importance of member equality.  During disaster deployments, a fire logistics leader 
is complemented by a police logistics leader, and vice versa, according to Joe Downey.  
Aside from equality in leadership, firefighters and police officers in the joint Mumbai-
style unit would be considered equal members, acknowledging that skill sets from both 
services are necessary to complete the mission, as perceptual cues will encourage 
“reduce[d] intergroup differentiation” (Crisp & Abrams, 2008, p. 247).  According to 
clinical tests, “members of high-status groups tend to show more bias than members of 
low status groups” (Hewstone et al., 2002, p. 585) 
With USAR’s New York Task Force 1, which is the only current example of a 
truly joint FDNY/NYPD unit, members of both agencies are expected to treat each other 
as equals.  “When we go out the door,” said Battalion Chief Joseph Downey, “we are 
evenly matched with PD.”  Chief Downey said that firefighters and police officers in NY 
TF-1 are expected to share hotel rooms when they deploy, providing another mechanism 
to promote equality and cooperation.  As far emphasizing the same status, “I think it 
works because the positions are spelled out” he added, “everything is divided fifty-fifty” 
(personal communication, September 7, 2010).  Problems related to the SWARM units 
will go beyond group bias if all components are not shared equally.  “Majority groups 
tend to use their superior power and resources to construct requirements for inclusion in 
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the elite group that serve as barriers to exclude minority group members” (Moghaddam, 
2008, p. 35).  Just as NY-TF1 is controlled by a third party, the New York City Mayor’s 
Office of Emergency Management (OEM), instead of the NYPD or FDNY, it would not 
serve the SWARM units well to be absorbed into one of the participating emergency 
response agencies.  If one agency dominates resources or leadership, the joint unit will 
not function to its full potential.   
J. TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY AND MORTALITY SALIENCE  
Another approach to explain the dynamics of identity and group bias is called 
Terror Management Theory (TMT), pioneered by cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Greenberg et al., 1990, p. 308).  Despite the misleading name, 
TMT does not refer to counterterrorism or terrorism mitigation strategies.  Instead, TMT 
“proposes that people have a need for self-preservation and that this need is frustrated by 
their awareness of the inevitability of their own death” (Hewstone et al., 2002, p. 582).   
TMT is based on two primary postulates: one, like all living things, humans are 
motivated by self-preservation; and two, humans are self-aware of their mortality. When 
the two postulates are combined, the thought of certain death, whether conscious or 
unconscious, “gives rise to potentially overwhelming terror,” according to Moghaddam 
(2008, p. 59).  Simply stated, mortality salience, according to TMT, increases ingroup 
favoritism.   
According to McDermott and Zimbardo, “Terror management theory has 
demonstrated that reminding people of their mortality affects their evaluations of others” 
(2007, p. 363).  To create a buffer against the anxiety that felt concerning their certain 
death, people will set up a belief systems and cultures in an attempt to place some order 
on their lives (Greenberg et al., 1990, p. 308).  Culture provides order, meaning, value, 
along with symbolic immortality, which raises a belief holders’ self esteem.  According 
to a 1996 article in European Journal of Social Psychology, “If thinking about death 
threatens self-esteem, the self-esteem hypothesis can explain the effects of MS [mortality 
salience] on intergroup bias” (Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996, p. 
681).   
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Terror management theory (TMT) highlights the self-protective mechanisms of 
culture (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 61), which provide another way to separate ingroups and 
outgroups.  Under TMT, ingroup members and their common beliefs are portrayed more 
positively, compared to outgroup members and their perceived dissimilar beliefs, which 
are seen as threats (Hewstone et al., 2002, p. 582).  Moghaddam stated, “Terror 
Management Theory suggests that when organizing for intergroup contact, there is an 
urgent need to educate each group about beliefs, values, and normative systems other 
than their own” (2008, p. 64).   
Anyone who routinely performs in life-threatening situations, such as emergency 
responders, who have witnessed civilian and colleague fatalities, would be expected to 
experience some form of anxiety or “terror,” whether consciously or unconsciously, 
which strongly influences group favoritism and interaction.  A study of the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing showed that stress for emergency responders is most 
pronounced when performing body recovery and identification, and highest when 
children were involved (Paton & Violanti, 2007, p. 235). 
If reactions to others depend on the implications of agreement and 
disagreement for an individual's worldview, and if people's beliefs need to 
be defended because of the anxiety buffering function that they serve, then 
it follows that reminding people of what they are most frightened of 
should increase their tendency to respond positively to those who are 
similar and negatively to those who are different. Thus, reminding people 
of their mortality should increase the positivity of evaluations of those 
who bolster the cultural worldview and the negativity of evaluations of 
those who threaten it. (Greenberg et al., 1990, p. 309) 
Fortunately, mortality salience can be minimized if a person feels some control 
over their own death.  According to a 2008 article in Social Psychology: “Beliefs of 
control over death in particular and over life events in general may therefore decrease the 
impact MS may have on the development and self-perpetuation of intergroup conflict” 
(Niesta et al., 2008, p. 54).  Another benefit of training and frequent intergroup 
interaction specific to Mumbai-type terrorism will make participants in the SWARM unit 
more capable and confident, which will lower the MS effect.   
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Surprisingly, there are some benefits to the MS effect.  Under certain conditions, 
people can be more charitable when events remind them of their mortality.  Psychologists 
asked, “Why is it in times of crisis, disaster, and death that individual and collective help 
is offered so generously?” (Niesta et al., 2008, p. 53).  Consistent with TMT, profound 
acts of benevolence are directed at people or groups that share the donor’s “worldview,” 
thus improving self-esteem.  Also, targeted generosity matches well with the theory of 
selective altruism based on humanity’s hunter-gatherer past.  The challenge would be to 
widen the perception of the ingroup, including all SWARM units members, widening the 
arc of generosity.     
Studies show that the “benevolence norm” can be primed into participants under 
mortality salience.  Pro-social attitudes and behaviors were nurtured through “self-
transcendent norms,” following reminders of mortality.  It is not exactly clear how 
cognitive priming can alter bias norms, but the idea is compelling.  Other research, which 
combined SIT, TMT and MS, found “that priming group permeability nullified the MS 
effect on ingroup favoritism” (Niesta et al., 2008, pp. 54, 56).  Group barriers can 
dissolve, even in recognition of TMT and MS mechanisms.     
K. NEED FOR PRE-CRISIS PREPARATIONS  
For the joint FD/PD unit, or any interagency entity for that matter, the time to 
break down group barriers is not during a life-threatening situation, where people have 
tendency to cognitively retract, but during joint training and other low intensity 
interactions.  When a Mumbai-type terrorist attack does occur, it would be ideal if 
firefighters and police officers already viewed their counterparts as genuine co-members 
in the SWARM units and not intruders.  Pre-existing relationships and protocols are 
essential.  “We observe that the stakeholders involved in crisis persisted in repeating their 
habitual practices for the whole duration of the crisis,” according to the French study on 
improvisation (Roux-Dufort & Vidaillet, 2003, p. 88).  Joint maneuvers and training, and 
acceptance of counterparts, must be built into “habitual practices” before the crisis 
occurs.  
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Research confirms that group and organizational adaptability is reduced during a 
crisis, but “for trained personnel, crises enhance alertness and thinking skills” (Paton & 
Violanti, 2007, p 237).  A well-trained SWARM unit member will be better 
psychologically equipped to adjust to the chaos of a Mumbai-style terrorist attack; 
otherwise, participants will revert to their most basic single-agency tendencies.  New 
York City emergency responders “should be given opportunities to develop new 
solutions, to change quickly from the role that is normally theirs to other roles” (Roux-
Dufort & Vidaillet, 2003, p. 93). 
In crises, organizational members tend to shy away from creativity and 
flexibility, and to have difficulties drawing the whole picture of what is 
going on. Other types of behavior identified in the literature on crisis 
management show that, in crisis situations, decision makers are tempted to 
rely on familiar routines, procedures, and frames of reference through 
which they view the situation, and to strive to manage it, even though 
these procedures and frames may be inappropriate for the situation at hand 
(Kilpatrick 1969. Stubbart 1987; Vidaillet 2001). Routines help reduce 
uncertainty by applying familiar sequences of action formalized. (Roux-
Dufort & Vidaillet, 2003, p. 93) 
L. GROUP LEADERSHIP  
An examination of group bias for high performing groups, such as a joint 
FDNY/NYPD strike team, would not be complete without a brief look at group 
leadership and its influence on perceptions and behavior.  “The values, attitudes, and 
goals that leaders inspire others to adopt and to follow are ones that serve the group as a 
collective and that define membership of the group,” according to a research paper on 
leadership in salient groups, “thus, leaders are able to transform individual action into 
group action” (Hogg Martin, Epitropaki, Mankad, Svensson, & Weeden, 2005, p. 991).  
Dual-agency leaders, either formal or informal, of the SWARM units will have a 
profound affect on whether the participants identify with the group positively.    
In a study on leadership and its effects on ingroup/outgroup perceptions, the 
authors said, “According to the social identity theory of leadership, a leader is often 
perceived as the most representative or prototypical member of the group, particularly in 
cases of high group salience or in cases where members and leaders identify strongly 
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with the group (Hains et al., 1997; Haslam & Platow, 2001; Hogg et al., 1998)” (Pittinsky 
& Welle, 2008, p. 515).  As the most visible, crucial members of the group, leaders must 
have a positive opinion of their counterparts from the sister agency as the leaders’ 
opinions and prejudices will proliferate through the combined group.  
It would be unrealistic to assume that SWARM unit members, who are considered 
high identifiers, would blindly follow designated leaders.  It is crucial that the leaders 
exhibit traits that are considered appropriate to the group’s identity.  According to a 1997 
article in Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, “Under conditions of high salience, 
perceptions of leadership effectiveness and leadership effectiveness were influenced by 
the perceived prototypicality of the leader; prototypicality leaders were expected to be 
more effective and acceptable than nonprototypical leaders” (Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 
1997, p. 1096).  To avoid negative reactions, unit leaders would have to find ways to 
promote cooperation and a collective identity in the group that does not appear atypical 
by its membership.   
It is up to the leaders to diffuse any tensions between firefighters and police 
officers.  “The leader’s actions in displacing aggression must be carefully monitored and 
controlled,” according to Moghaddam, “by mobilizing collective action against an 
outgroup, a leader can unleash aggressive, potentially destructive sentiments onto 
perceived dissimilar targets and influence people to rally around a flag” (2008, p. 63).  If 
a leader accepts the SWARM unit as another identity, sister-agency counterparts will not 
be seen as outsiders, and subordinates will pick up on those cognitive cues.   
Lastly, leaders must treat everyone in the unit as equals. Hogg et al. explain, “In 
salient groups, effective leaders need to treat all members fairly and equally as common 
group members” (2005, p. 994).  As explored in the section on stereotype threats, 
equality in status and function lowers perceived differentiation between intergroups.  The 
same bias dynamics at work at the participant level will be even more important for 
group leaders.   
To conclude, the theories on group bias based on social identity theory are meant 
to be complementary and interchangeable, depending on the specific bias dynamic.  
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Intergroup bias, which is also influenced by history, competition for resources, and other 
phenomena, is more complex than what can be explained by cognitive psychology, but 
this inquiry was meant to be a beginning of a study on firefighter and police officer 
identities, especially in the formation of SWARM units. According to Paton & Violanti 
(2007, p. 242):  
Recognition of the risk posed by terrorist events and the importance of 
learning from them must be consolidated into a culture that espouses the 
policies, procedures, practices, and attitudes required to facilitate a 
capacity for adaptive response to an uncertain future.   
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. General 
1. Fight a network with a network.  Form dual-agency SWARM units to 
engage a Mumbai-style terrorist threat. 
2. Within the Joint Group 
1. Promote pre-incident training for the SWARM units, which will improve 
both operational readiness and group harmony. 
2. Encourage group cohesiveness in the joint unit but not at the cost of 
distinctiveness. 
3. Ensure that the SWARM units are portrayed positively compared to like 
groups. 
4. Institute training and operational triggers to encourage a shift from “us” 
and “them” to “we” (as per CIIM). 
5. Include military combat veterans in fire service recruitment efforts for 
SWARM units. 
6. Emphasize cooperative tasks and common goals that drop simplified 
stereotypes. 
B CONCLUSION  
Unlike the 9/11 attacks, which surprised many, global trends in paramilitary 
terrorism are evident.  Most municipalities in the United States have an opportunity to 
prepare for Mumbai-style attacks before they occur in their respective cities.  For 
emergency responders to perform in this chaotic, hostile environment, adaptation will 
require more than new procedures and equipment; it will require a different way of 
thinking that bends traditional identities and roles and shatters group-bias tendencies as 
dual-agency, SWARM units form.  A widening sense of group identity and purpose, 
inspired by a greater cause, would indicate more than progress for emergency responders, 
but an incremental improvement in human social development.   
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APPENDIX A. DATA CHART FOR THE TOTAL 262 CODED 
ENTRIES (ALL THREE INTERVIEWS)  
Note 1: The following abbreviations were used in the graph to identify 
interviewees:  
 JWP = Joseph Pfeifer 
 JRD =  Joseph Downey 
 XYZ = anonymous police source 
Note 2: The final column (frequency) refers to the number of times an entry was 
used in the graph.  For example, the individual code “police caught above fire” was listed 
four times under the primary codes of preplanning (1), force protection (2), fire as a 
weapon (3) and interdependencies (4).  Because that phrase was relevant to many 




            
Interview Coding 
EP
P  Code Sub-Code Subject 
Interview
ee Frequency 
Active-Shooter at regular A-S 
Joint Units valid in regular active-shooter with possible 
darkness, etc.  XYZ 4 
Active-Shooter Joint Training 
Incidents are never the same at A-S, but concepts and 
principles are the same  XYZ 2 
Active-Shooter Multiple Shooters 
A-S is usually one shooter, terrorist A-S is usually multiple 
shooters XYZ 2 
Active-Shooter Specialization 
If avg. patrolman trained in A-S, can mitigate possible 
school siege  XYZ 2 
Active-Shooter Time 
The main issue is speed of engagement, based on case 
studies. XYZ 1 
Active-Shooter w/ 
Fire Fire/smoke PD does not train for low-light or smoke, or even noise. XYZ 1 
Active-Shooter w/ 
Fire Mitigation Must find the best way to mitigate. XYZ 1 
Active-Shooter w/ 
Fire Priorities  Must figure out priorities w/ people trapped: fire or shootout? XYZ 2 
Active-Shooter w/ 
Fire Psychology of Fire 
Many psychological barriers for both terrorists and rescuers 
with fire/smoke. XYZ 1 
Active-Shooter w/ 
Fire Simple Attacks Low tech is easy to do, with tremendous impact. XYZ 2 
Awareness General Training Proposes some type of awareness training for all FFs XYZ 2 
Awareness Specialization 
Limited specialization may not be best for fast, dynamic 
incidents. XYZ 2 
Capability  Breaking Point 
In exercises, there's discrepancy in what is promised versus 
capability. XYZ 2 
Capability  General Training 
Idea is to have first-arriving patrolman "slow down" the 
situation. XYZ 2 
Capability  Joint Unit Training 
NYC responders are not ready to integrate at Mumbai-type 














Capability  Priorities  
During attack, FDNY may have to put fire out for PD to 
proceed. JRD 1 
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Capability  Specialization 
Trend in law enforcement towards specialization of select 
few. XYZ 1 
Capacity Assault Teams Average assault team is two officers. XYZ 1 
Capacity Assault Teams Average patrolman cannot integrate with SWAT team. XYZ 1 
Capacity Breaking Point Important to realistically claim operational limits in exercises  XYZ 2 
Capacity Breaking Points 
Expanding agencies' breaking points with training, group/org 
bias. JWP 1 
Capacity Joint Unit Training 
NYC responders are not ready to integrate at Mumbai-type 
attack. XYZ 4 
Capacity 
multiple 
weapons/IIDs Multiple weapons/IIDs attacks can overwhelm resources. JWP 1 
Capacity Time Need for expeditious response.  JWP 2 
Collaboration CIMS 
CIMS does not encourage true collaboration, too much gray 
area. JRD 2 
Collaboration Priorities  
During attack, FDNY may have to put fire out for PD to 
proceed JRD 3 
Collaboration Separation PD and FD operate inside a vacuum.  XYZ 1 
Command  
Building 
Vulnerability Better if pre-organized than executed ad hoc.   JWP 3 
Command  CIMS 
CIMS does not encourage true collaboration, too much gray 
area. JRD 1 
Command  Joint Training 
Would like to see more joint training, but need new 
parameters. JRD 1 
Command  Joint Training Interdisciplinary training must be done at all levels. XYZ 1 
Command  Separation PD and FD operate inside a vacuum.  XYZ 2 
Delivery Assault Teams Average assault team is two officers. XYZ 2 
Delivery Joint Tabletops Need for joint tabletops JWP 2 
Delivery Specialization 
We've [PD] specialized into a corner: too much reliance of 
special units. XYZ 2 
Delivery Specialization 
Limited specialization may not be best for fast, dynamic 
incidents. XYZ 1 















The main issue is speed of engagement, base on previous 
studies. XYZ 2 
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Delivery Time ESU has SWAT training, but may not get there in time.  XYZ 1 
Delivery Unit Make-up The biggest enemy is time. XYZ 1 
Enemy Adaptability Escalate 
Will terrorists up the ante as they learn from previous 
incidents? XYZ 1 
Enemy Adaptability Time 
Terrorists think long-term, may fortify building like Beslan 
next time. XYZ 1 
Equality NY-TF1 OEM in charge of USAR. JRD 2 
Equality Positions Pre-set, explicit positions - all divisions made 50/50.  JRD 1 
Equality Uniforms All USAR members wear same uniform, ID'ed as NY-TF1. JRD 2 
Equipment Joint Unit Training Need for proper training and equipment for joint units. JWP 4 
Fire as a Weapon at regular A-S 
Joint units valid in regular active-shooter with possible 
darkness, etc.  XYZ 2 
Fire as a Weapon Joint Unit Training Proper training and equipment for joint units. JWP 3 
Fire as a Weapon NYC Attack 
With European terror alerts, threat of Mumbai-type attack 
increasing.  XYZ 2 
Fire as a Weapon PD above Fire Police caught above fire. JWP 3 
Fire as a Weapon Simple Attacks Will lead to more attacks - easier for terrorists to train.   JWP 1 
Fire as a Weapon Simple Attacks Use of less skilled attacker. JWP 1 
Fire as a Weapon Simple Attacks Shift to very low tech. XYZ 2 
Fire as a Weapon with firearms Multiple weapons/IIDs. JWP 2 
Force Protection Armed FFs Agrees that FF veterans would be a good recruitment pool. XYZ 3 
Force Protection Joint Unit Training Need for proper training and equipment for joint units. JWP 2 
Force Protection medical treatment Need for medical treatment before "all clear." JWP 1 
Force Protection One System Police, fire & EMS in one system.  JWP 2 
Force Protection PD above Fire Police caught above fire. JWP 2 
Group Bias Breaking Points 
Expanding agencies' breaking points with training, and 
minimizing group/org bias.  JWP 3 
Group Bias NY-TF1 
NY-TF1 does predrills, mobilizations together - relationship 
builders. JRD 2 
Group Bias NY-TF1 NY-TF1 has built better relationships with ESU overall JRD 1 
Group Bias NY-TF1 USAR model: same uniform, together in one mission. JWP 2 
Group Bias NY-TF1 Equipment Equipment caches checked regularly, relationship builders. JRD 2 
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Group Bias One System increasing stress level at incidents [compared to training]. JWP 1 
Intelligence Real-time Info Good idea, PD usually has better real-time intelligence.  JRD 2 
Interdependencies Armed FFs 
Agree that FF military veterans would be a good recruitment 
pool. XYZ 2 
Interdependencies 
Building 
Vulnerability Better if pre-organized than executed ad hoc.   JWP 2 
Interdependencies Joint Training At drills, PD wrongly assumes what other agencies can do. XYZ 2 
Interdependencies Joint Training If FFs armed, must have high level of training. XYZ 2 
Interdependencies medical treatment Need for medical treatment before "all clear." JWP 2 
Interdependencies Mitigation Must find the best way to mitigate.  XYZ 3 
Interdependencies More dialogue Calls for more interdisciplinary dialogue and "hybrid ideas." XYZ 1 
Interdependencies One System Police, fire & EMS in one system.  JWP 1 
Interdependencies PD above Fire Police caught above fire. JWP 4 
Joint Units at regular A-S 
Joint units valid in regular active-shooter with possible 
darkness, etc.  XYZ 3 
Joint Units Breaking Point 
Smart decision [joint unit] for managers, but has to be 




Better if pre-organized than executed ad hoc, same with 
Unified Command.  JWP 1 
Joint Units Finance 
likes integration, but not dedicated team - would be 
underused and expensive.   XYZ 1 
Joint Units Hostages 
Less enthusiastic about full-time teams, concerned about 
cross training. XYZ 1 
Joint Units Joint Training If FFs armed, must have a high level of training. XYZ 1 
Joint Units Joint Unit Training 
Use of police who are volunteer FFs not the answer, need 
professionals. JRD 1 
Joint Units Joint Unit Training 
Must have pre-designated positions to work in chaotic 
situation. JRD 2 
Joint Units Joint Unit Training 
NYC responders are not ready to integrate at Mumbai-type 
attack. XYZ 1 
Joint Units NYC Attack 
Should not wait for a high-fatality event in NYC before 
making changes. XYZ 3 














Joint Units NY-TF1 NY-TF1 does predrills and mobilizations together - JRD 1 
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relationship builders. 
Joint Units NY-TF1 Training 
For joint units, training with PD difficult due to different 
schedules.  JRD 2 
Joint Units Opposition Expect opponents, but sell idea as essential for life safety.  XYZ 2 
Joint Units Real-time Info Good idea, PD usually has better real-time intelligence.  JRD 1 
Joint Units Specialization 
Limited specialization may not be best for fast, dynamic 
incidents. XYZ 5 
Joint Units Time Biggest enemy is time. XYZ 2 
Joint Units Training Realism 
Training scenarios would have to be as realistic as possible 
(hirise, etc.). XYZ 2 
Joint Units Uniforms Must figure out uniforms and primary roles before incident. XYZ 1 
Joint Units Unit Make-up 
Great idea [joint unit] but how?  Dedicated unit? Form at 
incident?   XYZ 1 
Joint Units Unit Make-up 
"Fantastic idea" but standing team or ad hoc (formed at 
incident)? XYZ 1 
Leadership NY-TF1 OEM in charge of USAR.; JRD 1 
Leadership Positions FD/PD supervisors closely control behavior of subordinates.  JRD 1 
Mission Clarity CIMS 
CIMS does not encourage true collaboration, too much gray 
area. JRD 3 
Mission Clarity Joint Training No core compentency are being challenged, just enhanced. XYZ 1 
Mission Clarity Joint Unit Training 
Must have pre-designated positions to work in chaotic 
situation JRD 3 
Mission Clarity Positions Pre-set, explicit positions.  All tasks made 50/50.  JRD 3 
Mission Clarity Priorities  
Must figure out priorities w/ people trapped: fire or shoot 
out?  XYZ 1 
Mission Clarity Stress 
Stress to members importance of groups, explicit 
instructions JRD 2 
Mission Clarity Uniforms Must figure out uniforms, primary job, before incident XYZ 2 
Mumbai Threat Armed FFs 
Agrees that FF military veterans would be a good 
recruitment pool XYZ 1 
Mumbai Threat at regular A-S 
Joint Units valid in regular active-shooter with possible 
darkness, etc.  XYZ 1 














Mumbai Threat Brain Storm Work through problems beforehand to uncover new ideas JWP 2 
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Mumbai Threat Improvisation Customize and improvise tactics to the threat JWP 2 
Mumbai Threat Innovation Need for innovative thinking when no clear pattern evident JWP 1 
Mumbai Threat Innovation 
We cannot say that we did not think of this threat [Mumbai-
type attack] XYZ 2 
Mumbai Threat Joint Training If FFs armed, must have high level of training XYZ 4 
Mumbai Threat Joint Unit Training 
NYC responders are not ready to integrate at Mumbai-type 
attack XYZ 2 
Mumbai Threat Mitigation Must find the best way to mitigate  XYZ 2 
Mumbai Threat Multiple Shooters 
A-S is usually one shooter, terrorist A-S is usually multiple 
shooters XYZ 3 
Mumbai Threat NYC Attack Mumbai attack in NYC JWP 1 
Mumbai Threat NYC Attack 
wWth European terror alerts, threat of Mumbai-type attack 
increasing  XYZ 1 
Mumbai Threat NYC Attack NYPD has created CRIC teams  XYZ 1 
Mumbai Threat NYC Attack 
With Joint Units, at least NYC can say it tried to solve the 
problem XYZ 2 
Mumbai Threat Priorities  
During attack, FDNY may have to put fire out for PD to 
proceed JRD 2 
Mumbai Threat Simple Attacks Very low tech XYZ 1 
Mumbai Threat Simple Attacks Low tech is easy to do, with tremendous impact XYZ 1 
Mumbai Threat Specialization 
Limited specialization may not be best for fast, dynamic 
incidents XYZ 4 
Mumbai Threat Training Realism 
Training scenarios would have to be as realistic as possible 
(hirise, etc.) XYZ 3 
Novelty Improvisation Customize and improvise tactics to the threat JWP 1 
Novelty Improvisation We should prepare based on innovations, not just mistakes XYZ 1 
Novelty Innovation Need for innovative thinking when no clear pattern is evident JWP 2 
Novelty Innovation 
We cannot say that we did not think of this threat [Mumbai-
type attack] XYZ 1 
Novelty More dialogue Calls for more interdisciplinary dialogue and "hybrid ideas" XYZ 2 
Novelty NYC Attack 
Planners tend to equate highly-unlikely occurrence with 




Always a defining incident that changes procedures (San 





Tendency to not for train for the anomaly in hopes it won't 
repeat XYZ 2 
Operational Limits Time Need to understand risks and incident durations JWP 1 
Other Models Military Suggests a look at military models of integrated members JWP 1 
Other Models NY-TF1 NY-TF1 has built better relationships with ESU overall JRD 3 
Other Models NY-TF1 USAR model, same uniform, together in one mission JWP 3 
Other Models NY-TF1 Training 
USAR FD/PD do most training separately (confine space, 
etc.) JRD 1 
Other Models NY-TF1 Training NY-TF1 police get basic firefighter training JRD 1 
Other Models Uniforms all USAR members wear same uniform, ID'ed as NY-TF1 JRD 3 
Political Issues Finance 
likes integration, but not dedicated team - would be 
underused.  Money issue. XYZ 2 
Political Issues NYC Attack 
Politically, it would be damaging if a city had not prepared 
for Mumbai XYZ 1 
Political Issues NYC Attack 
With Joint Units, at least NYC can say it tried to solve the 
problem XYZ 1 
Political Issues Opposition Expect opponents, but sell as a life saver XYZ 1 
Political Issues Possible Fatalities 
Can be sold as more people to die if we do not do it (Joint 
Units) XYZ 1 
Preplanning Brain Storm Work through problems beforehand to uncover new ideas JWP 1 
Preplanning Improvisation We should prepare based on innovations, not just mistakes XYZ 2 
Preplanning Joint Training 
Incidents are never the same at A-S, concepts and 
principles are the same  XYZ 1 
Preplanning Joint Unit Training 
Must have pre-designated positions to work in chaotic 
situation JRD 1 
Preplanning NY-TF1 Equipment 
Equipment caches checked regularly, also a relationship 
builders JRD 1 
Preplanning PD above Fire Police caught above fire JWP 1 
Preplanning Positions Pre-set, explicit positions.  All tasks made 50/50.  JRD 2 
Responder 
Adaptability NYC Attack 
Should not wait for a high-fatality event in NYC before 





Always a defining incident that changes procedures (San 














Training/Education Brain Storm Think through possible scenarios with taskforces JWP 2 
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Training/Education Breaking Point 
In exercises, discrepancy in what is promised versus 
capability XYZ 1 
Training/Education Breaking Point Important to realistically claim operational limits in exercises  XYZ 1 
Training/Education Breaking Points 
Expanding agencies' breaking points with training, lowering 
group/org bias  JWP 2 
Training/Education Fire/smoke PD does not train for low light or smoke, or even noise XYZ 2 
Training/Education General Training 
Idea is to have first arriving patrolman "slow" the situation 
down XYZ 1 
Training/Education General Training Would be a burden to keep all members trained up XYZ 1 
Training/Education General Training Would be a burden to keep all members trained up XYZ 2 
Training/Education General Training Proposes some type of awareness training for all FFs XYZ 1 
Training/Education Hostages 
Less enthusiastic about full-time teams, concerned about 
cross training XYZ 2 
Training/Education Joint Tabletops Joint Tabletops JWP 1 
Training/Education Joint Training Joint Training JWP 1 
Training/Education Joint Training At drills, wrongly assume what other agencies can do XYZ 1 
Training/Education Joint Training Interdisciplinary training must be done at all levels XYZ 2 
Training/Education Joint Training If FFs armed, must have high level of training XYZ 3 
Training/Education Joint Unit Training 
Use of police volunteer FFs not the answer, need 
professionals JRD 2 
Training/Education Joint Unit Training Proper training and equipment for joint units JWP 1 
Training/Education medical treatment Need for medical treatment before "all clear" JWP 3 
Training/Education Multiple Shooters 
A-S is usually one shooter, terrorist A-S is usually multiple 
shooters XYZ 1 
Training/Education NYC Attack 
With European terror alerts, threat of Mumbai-type attack 
increasing  XYZ 3 
Training/Education NYC Attack 
Should not wait for a high-fatality event in NYC before 
making changes XYZ 2 
Training/Education NY-TF1 NY-TF1 has built better relationships with ESU overall JRD 2 
Training/Education NY-TF1 USAR model, same uniform, together in one mission JWP 1 
Training/Education NY-TF1 Training USAR FD/PD do most training separately  JRD 2 














Training/Education NY-TF1 Training NY-TF1 police get basic firefighter training JRD 2 
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Training/Education NY-TF1 Training 
For joint units, training with PD difficult due to different 




Must train for the anomalies, that do not fit the trends (long 
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Tendency to not for train for the anomaly, in hopes it won't 
repeat XYZ 1 
Training/Education Specialization 
Trend in law enforcement towards specialization of select 
few XYZ 2 
Training/Education Specialization Suggests instead to bring up training of average patrolman XYZ 1 
Training/Education Specialization Suggests instead to bring up training of average patrolman XYZ 2 
Training/Education Specialization 
PD has specialized into a corner, too much reliance of 
special units XYZ 1 
Training/Education Specialization 
If avg. patrolman trained in A-S, he can mitigate possible 
school siege  XYZ 1 
Training/Education Specialization 
Limited specialization may not be best for fast, dynamic 
incidents XYZ 3 
Training/Education Stress Increasing stress level at incidents (compared to training) JWP 2 
Training/Education Training Realism 
Training scenarios would have to be as realistic as possible 
(hirise, etc.) XYZ 1 
Uniformed 
Appearance Uniforms All USAR members wear same uniform, ID'ed as NY-TF1 JRD 1 
Communications Terrorist Training Internet-based training for terrorists (e.g., Times Square) JWP 1 
Enemy Adaptability Terrorist Training Internet-based training for terrorists (e.g., Times Square) JWP 1 
Fire as a Weapon 
Building 
Vulnerability Building vulnerability, water systems JWP 2 
Preplanning 
Building 














Vulnerability Building vulnerability analysis, e.g.. standpipes, etc.  JWP 1 
Accountability NY-TF1 Any problems are addressed after deployment, but very few JRD 2 
Delivery Time 
Lesson learned at Columbine/Binghamton was need to 










Leadership NY-TF1 Any problems are addressed after deployment, but very few JRD 1 
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Training/Education Time 
Lesson learned at Columbine/Binghamton was need to 
move quickly XYZ 2 
Active-Shooter w/ 
Fire Hostages 
No police commander in U.S. would base decision on 
"acceptable losses" XYZ 1 
Active-Shooter w/ 
Fire Ops in Darkness 
FFs work well in limited sensory environment, unlike avg 
police officer XYZ 1 
Active-Shooter w/ 
Fire Ops in Darkness 
FFs work well in limited sensory environment, unlike avg 
police officer XYZ 2 
Active-Shooter w/ 
Fire PD above Fire PD may be lured to upper floors before fires set XYZ 3 
Active-Shooter w/ 
Fire Russian CT 
Russian CT more aggressive, expect some losses, but not 
U.S. policy XYZ 2 
Capacity Breaking Point Limits should not be revealed at the scene XYZ 1 
Capacity Breaking Point 
If your limits are reached, you are not longer a part of the 
equation XYZ 2 
Capacity Breaking Points Asking how much can we do? Get there? JWP 1 
Capacity Multiple Incidents Multiple incidents JWP 1 
Capacity Traffic, Recall  Traffic issues that would delay recall  JWP 1 
Command  Boro Command FDNY borough command system  JWP 1 
Command  Breaking Point May have to split resources based on available information XYZ 2 
Command  Citywide Awareness Citywide situational awareness, hastily formed networks JWP 1 
Delivery Breaking Points Asking how much can we do? Get there? JWP 2 
Delivery Time First hour is extremely important, assets will not be place XYZ 1 
Enemy Adaptability Fire/smoke 
At Mumbai, terrorists knew fire/smoke would slow police 
assault XYZ 1 
Enemy Adaptability IEDs At Mumbai, IEDs in bags mixed other bags at train station XYZ 1 
Enemy Adaptability Simple Attacks Simpler attacks, instead of CBRN  JWP 1 
Equality NY-TF1 Positions USAR teams split by positions, not parent agency  JRD 2 
Equality Positions Evenly matched at incidents JRD 1 
Fire as a Weapon Breaking Point 
Even NYC will not have resources to address multiple A-S 
attacks XYZ 3 










Fire as a Weapon Smoke Smoke could be advantage to responders, train with TIC JWP 3 
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Fire as a Weapon Standpipes Stairwells cut off, sprinklers OOS JWP 1 
Fire as a Weapon Standpipes Stairwells cut off, sprinklers OOS JWP 3 
Force Protection Diesel Fires Diesel fires to traps FFs during 70s  JWP 2 
Group Bias NY-TF1 
USAR brings better cooperation to day-to-day ops among 
players JRD 2 
Group Dynamics NY-TF1 
USAR brings better cooperation to day-to-day ops among 
players JRD 1 
Group Dynamics Stress 
Stress to members importance of groups, explicit 
instructions JRD 1 
Hostages Demands Hostages not released in North America on demands XYZ 1 
Hostages Hostages 
No police commander in U.S. would base decision on 
"acceptable losses" XYZ 2 
Hostages Non-terror Hostages 
Endgame for EDP hostage-taker different from terrorist with 
hostages XYZ 1 
Hostages Russian CT 
Russian CT more aggressive, expect some losses, but not 
U.S. policy XYZ 1 
Hostages Standpipes Stairwells cut off, sprinklers OOS JWP 2 
Hostages Terror Hostages 
In Beslan, use of pressure-switch IEDs suggests no real 
hostage negotiations  XYZ 1 
Hostages Time While isolating, containing and holding, we are wasting time XYZ 1 
Hostages Time Waiting can cost lives in terrorist hostage situation  XYZ 1 
Intelligence Breaking Point May have to split resources based on available information XYZ 1 
Intelligence Real-time Info Information while event is unfolding, delivery options JWP 1 
Interdependencies Ops in Darkness 
FFs work well in limited sensory environment, unlike avg 
police officer XYZ 3 
Interdependencies PD above Fire PD may be lured to upper floors before fires set XYZ 1 
Joint Units NY-TF1 Positions USAR teams split by positions, not parent agency  JRD 1 
Joint Units Time First hour is extremely important, assets will not be place XYZ 2 
Joint Units Time 
Question to who would go in first depending on immediate 
threat XYZ 1 
Leadership Priorities  
Question to who would go in first depending on immediate 










Ltd Sensory Environ. Smoke Smoke could be advantage to responders, train with TIC JWP 1 
  91
Mumbai Threat Breaking Point 
Even NYC will not have resources to address multiple A-S 
attacks XYZ 1 
Mumbai Threat Breaking Point 
Even NYC will not have resources to address multiple A-S 
attacks XYZ 2 
Mumbai Threat PD above Fire PD may be lured to upper floors before fires set XYZ 2 
Mumbai Threat Time Waiting can cost lives in terrorist hostage situation  XYZ 3 
Networks  Citywide Awareness Citywide situational awareness, hastily formed networks JWP 2 
Novelty Fire/smoke 
At Mumbai, terrorists knew fire/smoke would slow police 
assault XYZ 2 
Novelty IEDs At Mumbai, IEDs in bags mixed other bags at train station XYZ 2 
Operational Limits Breaking Point 
If your limits are reached, you are not longer a part of the 
equation XYZ 1 
Other Models NY-TF1 USAR integration is pervasive (share hotel rooms, etc.) JRD 1 
Other Models NY-TF1 Positions USAR teams split by positions, not parent agency  JRD 3 
Other Models Russian CT 
Russian CT more aggressive, expect some losses, but not 
U.S. policy XYZ 2 
Responder 
Adaptability General Training 
Right now, patrolman would not engage active-shooter 
offensively XYZ 1 
Responder 
Adaptability Smoke Smoke could be advantage to responders, train with TIC JWP 2 
Training/Education General Training 
Right now, patrolman would not engage active-shooter 
offensively XYZ 2 
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APPENDIX B. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
During this study, several tactical issues related to paramilitary terrorism were 
revealed.  Though not applicable to this inquiry, the most relevant points are listed below 
(in no particular order): 
 Child trauma is much different than adult trauma 
 Terrorists at Mumbai-style attacks may monitor cell phones or emergency 
dispatch frequencies, have advanced surveillance in place, or 
communicate with handlers remotely or in the crowd.  
 Contrary to active-shooter case studies, terrorists may switch to night or 
evening rush hour attacks enabled by night-vision goggles. 
 Terrorists use negotiations as delay tactics.  Expect absurd demands and 
rethink the hostage negotiation playbook. 
 Compile blueprints of high-profile soft targets (schools, hospitals, hotels, 
etc.) 
 Terrorists may choose isolated, complex layouts to barricade or siege. 
 Perimeters must be fluid enough to allow ambulances or emergency 
vehicles to pass.  Perimeters will be hard to maintain, especially if children 
are involved. 
 Entry points will likely be wired with explosives. 
 Terrorists increasingly use fedayeen methods (self-sacrifice attacks), 
where operatives have no escape strategy. 
 Learning from previous attacks, hostages will be split up by terrorists to 
complicate rescue efforts. 
 Law enforcement use of tear gas canisters aimed at building interiors may 
cause fires.  
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